2003
DOI: 10.1111/1475-4967.00120
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Commerce and Conflict: U.S. Effort to Counter Terrorism with Trade May Backfire

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Cited by 31 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…King Abdullah II has, since his succession to the throne in 1999, skilfully positioned his country as a supposed showcase partner in external interventions both elsewhere and at home. While the Jordanian military, for example, is a major contributor to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces and a close regional ally of the USA in military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria (for a discussion of contemporary US-Jordanian military collaboration, see Schuetze, 2017), external interventions in Jordanian politics range from humanitarian aid (primarily by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), via externally supported structural adjustment and economic liberalisation (see Hanieh, 2013;Moore, 2005;Moore and Schrank, 2003), to an impressive portfolio of international democracy promotion interventions. With $47 million out of the total annual $1 billion in US assistance assigned to programmes related to democracy, human rights and governance, the Jordan democracy promotion portfolio of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) constitutes both in absolute terms and in relation to population figures one of the largest worldwide (US Government, 2016).…”
Section: Why Care About a Parliament That Is Not Happening?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…King Abdullah II has, since his succession to the throne in 1999, skilfully positioned his country as a supposed showcase partner in external interventions both elsewhere and at home. While the Jordanian military, for example, is a major contributor to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces and a close regional ally of the USA in military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria (for a discussion of contemporary US-Jordanian military collaboration, see Schuetze, 2017), external interventions in Jordanian politics range from humanitarian aid (primarily by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), via externally supported structural adjustment and economic liberalisation (see Hanieh, 2013;Moore, 2005;Moore and Schrank, 2003), to an impressive portfolio of international democracy promotion interventions. With $47 million out of the total annual $1 billion in US assistance assigned to programmes related to democracy, human rights and governance, the Jordan democracy promotion portfolio of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) constitutes both in absolute terms and in relation to population figures one of the largest worldwide (US Government, 2016).…”
Section: Why Care About a Parliament That Is Not Happening?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Just as policies of the 1950s and 1960s were designed to cement political control, new reform policies were often geared toward bringing business into a tighter network with regime leaders. But the problem was that business as a social actor tends not to reform the institutions around it; rather it uses resident arrangements to pursue particular advantage (Moore and Schrank 2003). The private sector as harbinger of change failed.…”
Section: The Politics Of Economic Development and Reformmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, the long‐standing US approach to free trade might even intensify the region's social problems as long as transnational investors can easily exploit existing social structures (Moore and Schrank, 2003). The associated increase of inequalities in income distribution further exacerbates what, as the modernisation approach admits, constitutes a serious obstacle to democracy (Issawi, 1956; Lipset, 1993) and explains Egypt's return to an era of political de‐liberalisation as the direct outcome of the regime's attempts to exclude the losers of economic liberalisation from the political process (Kienle, 2001).…”
Section: Taking the Long Term View: The Modernisation School As A Ratmentioning
confidence: 99%