Comments on Thomas Kuhn’s Philosophy of Language

Condé, Mauro L.

doi:10.1590/0101-3173.2020.v43esp.26.p373

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“…Считается, что связь между Т. Куном и Л. Витгенштейном известна. (См., например, Condé, 2020;Pirozelli, 2020;De Oliveira, 2021].) Тем не менее, спустя 60 лет после выхода в свет «Структуры научных революций» продолжаются дискуссии о том, как интерпретировать философскую позицию автора (см., например, [Devlin, Bokulich, 2015]).…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

“…Отметим, что уже после написания этой статьи мы узнали о работе Р. Рэда, в которой ставится вопрос о том, не является ли Кун Витгенштейном наук. Однако наш подход с точки зрения к-реализма принципиально отличается от подхода Рэда, акцентирующего внимание на проблеме нонсенса.2 Многие авторы полагают, что позиция позднего Куна, в частности относительно несоизмеримости парадигм, менее радикальна (см., например,[Pirozelli, 2020;Condé, 2020;De Oliveira, 2021]). …”

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Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science from the point of view of a contextual realism

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2023

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We establish a connection between T. Kuhn’s philosophy of science and a Wittgensteinian contextual realism, as we understand it, and interpret the basic concepts of the former in terms of the latter. In particular, we interpret the notion of a scientific paradigm in terms of the notion of a form of life. For instance, we speak of Newtonian and quantum mechanics as grammars of the corresponding forms of life. The incommensurability of paradigms is due to the adoption of different norms (grammars). It is not absolute, as grammatical statements can change their status and become factual, and vice versa. Norms themselves evolve. We support Kuhn’s argument against Popper’s falsification principle with our interpretation of an established scientific theory as a Wittgensteinian norm (rule) for measuring reality. The norm is neither true nor false; its falsification makes no sense. We interpret Wittgenstein’s notion of a family resemblance, used by Kuhn, as the presence of a shared explicit or implicit Wittgensteinian rule (norm). We interpret Kuhn’s historical examples, in particular those with the systems of Ptolemy and Copernicus, relativity theory and quantum mechanics, and Kuhn’s view that participants in different paradigms see the world differently and that observation depends on theory, in terms of our thesis that ontology is sensitive to context. We thus resist the relativistic and constructivist interpretations of Kuhn’s position and show why it does not contradict the idea of scientific progress and the principle of correspondence between scientific theories. We also briefly compare Kuhn’s position with those of I. Lakatos, H. Chang (pragmatic realism) and J. MacFarlane (evaluative relativism), and compare our interpretation of Kuhn with his interpretation in terms of a naturalized transcendentalism proposed by M. Massimi.

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Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science from the point of view of a contextual realism

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2023

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Comments on Thomas Kuhn’s Philosophy of Language

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Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science from the point of view of a contextual realism

Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science from the point of view of a contextual realism

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