Religion and ethnicity are inextricably linked in discourse within and about Central Asia. One common narrative suggests that as a result of differences between historically sedentary and nomadic populations, ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks are naturally more religious and more likely to radicalize than their Kazakh and Kyrgyz neighbors. Using extensive data available from the Pew Research Center's 2012 The World's Muslims survey, this study examines whether such claims stand up to empirical scrutiny. The data cast doubt on simplified versions of this discourse and suggest that future analyses should focus attention on individual-level explanations rather than potentially essentializing group-based narratives. Religion and ethnicity have long been linked to one another in Central Asian public discourse. Since independence, state leaders have used Islamic identity as a tool of nation-building (Peyrouse 2007). Discourse concerning religious identity is also used to distinguish various Muslim ethnic groups from one another-that is, to differentiate Kyrgyz from Uzbeks, Kazakhs from Tajiks, and so on (Biard 2010; McBrien and Pelkmans 2008; Tromble 2014). And yet the connection between Islamic observance and ethnicity encompasses two common claims that are at best questionable, at worst dangerous. The first of these claims-that ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks are naturally more religious than Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen-draws on a longstanding historical narrative suggesting that Islam developed in its "purest" form among settled communities, while nomadic Muslims adulterated the faith by incorporating "traditional" elements of "shamanistic" practice. Not only does this narrative problematically essentialize Islam, but it requires us to presume that such broad historical tendencies continue to have a clear-cut effect to this day, even as nomadism has dwindled (Privratsky 2001). The second claim-that by virtue of their religiosity, Tajiks and Uzbeks are more likely to radicalize and actively support violence in the name of Islam-is even more worrisome, as it is often used to justify state monitoring and repression of these groups. Systematic evidence for both of these claims is also sparse. The first is most commonly supported by observational anecdotes wherein piety is assessed on the basis of a single or narrow range of characteristic(s), such as frequency of prayer or mosque attendance. The validity of the second claim typically relies on references to a very small number of high-profile cases of violence in the region as well as arrest records of so-called "extremists," records that are notorious for their bias. Deploying a rich set of survey data recently released by the Pew Research Center, this study seeks to explore the validity of the ethnicity-religiosity-radicalism nexus in greater depth. Drawing on 4,708 face-to-face interviews with self-identified Muslims in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, Pew's 2012 The World's Muslims dataset represents the largest-scale crosscountry survey undertaken in the region...