Combinatorial Auction Design

Porter, David; Rassenti, Stephen; Roopnarine, Anil; Smith, Vernon L.

doi:10.1017/9781316471609.006

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Pikovsky (2008) compared three selected linear price auction designs and the Vickrey-Clark-Groove auction using computer simulations and laboratory experiments. The selected auction designs are Clock Combinatorial auctions (Porter et al 2003), the RAD, and the author's own design, called ALPS. He observed that the auction designs performed very well for different value models even in the case of valuations that exhibit high synergy levels, although there are significant differences in the efficiency and revenue distributions of the evaluated designs.…”

Section: Simulation Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?

Iftekhar

Hailu

Lindner

2014

Canadian J Agri Economics

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Conservation auctions allow landholders to propose conservation projects and associated payments (bids) for consideration by a conservation agency. Recently, the application of iterative combinatorial auction designs has been proposed to improve outcomes of conservation auctions. In combinatorial auctions, landholders are allowed to offer projects each of which involves activities aimed at providing one or multiple services. An iterative format allows bidders the opportunity to gradually explore the type of projects they want to offer, with this process being facilitated through price feedback provided based on intermediate auction round results. Auction designs vary with the type of feedback and respond differently to market conditions. At present there is a lack of information about their performance in markets with varying degrees of competition (in terms of number of bidders and level of target). Therefore, using an agent‐based simulation model, we evaluate a number of iterative auction designs. We observe that a higher degree of competition leads to a higher auction efficiency. In a high competition environment, efficiency outcomes tend to be less sensitive to auction design choices. Therefore, an auctioneer could enjoy freedom in design choice if adequate competition could be ensured. In weak competition environments, however, some auction designs perform better than others.

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Section: Simulation Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?

Iftekhar

Hailu

Lindner

2014

Canadian J Agri Economics

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“…Each round is time restricted by the auctioneer, so each player has to place a bid before the end of the round; otherwise the bid is not considered valid. Finally, since the proposed auction is (semi-)combinatorial, package bidding is allowed [34] and is justifiably profitable for both seller and buyer.…”

Section: A Model Desccriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the context of our auction scheme, this means that the auction favors big players who bid for big packages of sub-projects. The threshold problem was mitigated by FCC by introducing the Combinatorial Clock (CC) [34], an auction type where the initial price is determined by the auctioneer and where the bidders express only their interest to purchase specific assets or packages at the current price. The prices rise automatically by a clock, as long as a bidder expresses her interest for an asset or packages.…”

Section: B Advantages and Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploitation of auctions for outsourcing security-critical projects

Kandias

Mylonas

Theoharidou

et al. 2011

2011 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC)

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ICT outsourcing may introduce several risks. This paper attempts to mitigate this problem by applying an auctioning scheme. By adopting the scheme, the involved organization selects one or more potential outsourced service providers via an auction similar to the FCC spectrum ones. The project is divided in sub-projects, bidders are pre-evaluated, in terms of security and each bid is assessed in terms of cost and appropriate security metrics. The bidding process continues according to the auction rules allocating all the sub-projects to the best bidders. The ultimate goal is to achieve upgraded security, while keeping the cost at a reasonable level and meeting adequate security requirements. In this direction our model provokes competition and motivates providers to place superior bids, in terms of security, while providing flexibility to the organization. The auction process is demonstrated through a case study, where the outsourcer is a critical infrastructure organization.

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“…Besides efficiency, CAs provide lower transaction costs and higher transparency [9]. A well-chosen auction format ensures a time-saving and efficient negotiation process when dealing with complex goods and consequently reduces transaction costs.…”

Section: Advantages Of the Combinatorial Auctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The most prominent mechanism is the Generalized Vickrey Auction by Varian and MacKieMason [15], which is based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [16]. The VCG mechanism has the auction participants reveal their real valuation function, as this is the only dominant bidding strategy [9]. Although many of game theoretic approaches exist in literature, most of them are not transferable to practicable auction processes.…”

Section: Problems With the Combinatorial Auctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design of Combinatorial Auctions for Allocation and Procurement Processes

Schwind¹

Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'05)

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The application of combinatorial auctions in procurement and allocation processes can help to achieve higher efficiency by taking the substitutionalities and complementarities of bundled goods valuation into consideration. The article describes criteria for the analysis, conceptualization and modeling of web-based combinatorial procurement and allocation systems. The foundations of combinatorial auctions are illustrated, followed by a view on several procedural variants. A number of obstacles such as design and usage complexity which eliminate the advantages of the combinatorial auction (allocation efficiency, transaction cost savings, and fairness) are then discussed. Based on these insights a draft of a comprehensive decision framework for application-oriented combinatorial auctions is given in the third part. Auction designs developed within the presented decision framework have to be evaluated before going into industry deployment. The article therefore closes with a process model for the experimental and simulative verification of the planned auction design.

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Combinatorial Auction Design

Cited by 7 publications

References 2 publications

Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?

Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?

Exploitation of auctions for outsourcing security-critical projects

Design of Combinatorial Auctions for Allocation and Procurement Processes

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