Combatting corruption with public deliberation

Abstract

Building on Seumas Miller's concept of corruption leads me to conclude that the question of disposition is central to the concept of corruption, which prompts me to consider punishment theories with regard to deterring dispositions to corruption. However, problems with punishment as a stand-alone approach lead me to consider institutional reform recommendations. Although institutional reforms have the weakness of merely engaging corrupt disposition in a hide-and-seek game, I seek to reconcile institutional approaches and moral individualism by suggesting that the former is intended to aid the latter, in the sense that resisting corruption is a question of cost, and the onus is to determine how to reduce this cost. In this regard, prevailing proposals are inept without an enabling environment: public deliberation (comprising publicity and deliberation) is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for combating corruption, because it (1) compels reason to function at its best, (2) demands rational accountability, and therefore account-giving, (3) increases 'common-good' thinking, (4) facilitates the recruitment of responsible institutional role-occupants, and (5) is a self-correcting instrument.

Biaya Seikhlasnya or Sincere Tariffs in Public Service: Citizenqs Responses Towards Vague Corruption Practices

“…In democracy setting, citizens are deemed to be the checker of public official"s behavior. However, the control mechanism not always occurs as were discussed [7]. As citizens might think the process is something inheritance and cultural matter [4].…”

“…This research is important as citizen check and balances are regarded for one of the defending mechanisms to maintain social structure [7] and associate with effort of maintaining trust of formal structures [8]. By take a look at the citizen responses, it is also addressed of how future efforts should be taken in order to prevent personal benefit in principal-agent relations.…”