Combating Parallel Importing: Views of US Exporters to the Asia‐Pacific Region

Palia, Aspy P.; Keown, Charles F.

doi:10.1108/02651339110141265

Cited by 26 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Research on parallel imports has often been undertaken by scholars in business schools and economics departments, e.g., Palia and Keown (1991), Dutta, Bergen and John (1994), Malueg and Schwartz (1994), Barfield and Groombridge (1998), Maskus (2000), and Maskus and Chen (2004). Game-theory based models developed by Dutta, Bergen and John (1994) and Maskus and Chen (2004) are probably the most important theoretical works on parallel imports.…”

Section: Literature Review and Analytical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Disenfranchisement is costly for manufacturers because of the expenses that are incurred in monitoring the incidents of offence, and a one-price-for-all policy eliminates the opportunities for price discrimination (Cespedes, Corey and Rangan 1988, 79;Cavusgil and Sikora 1988;Palia and Keown 1991).…”

Section: Parallel Imports and Distribution Strategies Of Cocacolamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Regional Monopoly and Interregional and Intraregional Competition: The Parallel Trade in Coca‐Cola Between Shanghai and Hangzhou in China

Yeung

Mok

2006

Economic Geography

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This article uses a "principal-agent-sub-agent" analytical framework and data collected from field surveys in China to (1) investigate the nature and causes of the parallel trade in Coca-Cola between Shanghai and Hangzhou, and (2) assess the geographical and theoretical implications for the regional monopolies that have been artificially created by Coca-Cola in China. The parallel trade in CocaCola is sustained by its intra-regional rivalry with Pepsi-Cola in Shanghai, where Coca-Cola (China) (the principal) seeks to maximize its share of the Shanghai soft drinks market. This goal effectively supersedes the market-division strategy of Coca-Cola (China), as the gap in wholesale prices between the Shanghai and Hangzhou markets is higher than the transaction costs of engaging in parallel trade.The exclusive distributor of Coca-Cola in the Shanghai market (the sub-agent), makes opportunistic use of a situation in which it does not have to bear the financial consequences of the major residual claimants (the principal and other agents), and has an incentive to enter the non-designated Coca-Cola market of Hangzhou by crossing the geographical boundary between the two regional monopolies devised by Coca-Cola. This promotes inter-regional competition between the Shanghai and Hangzhou bottlers (the agents). This article enhances our understanding of the economic geography of spatial equilibrium, disequilibrium and quasi-equilibrium of a TNC's distribution system and its artificially created market boundary in China.

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Section: Literature Review and Analytical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Parallel Imports and Distribution Strategies Of Cocacolamentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional Monopoly and Interregional and Intraregional Competition: The Parallel Trade in Coca‐Cola Between Shanghai and Hangzhou in China

Yeung

Mok

2006

Economic Geography

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“…In contrast, the wisdom of remaining open to parallel trade is at the center of policy discussions regarding means by which poor countries can gain access to medicines to combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases (Scherer and Watal, 2002). 3 See also Chard and Mellor (1989), Duhan and Sheffet (1988), Maskus (2000), and Palia and Keown (1991).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of parallel imports on investments in cost-reducing research and development

Maskus

2006

Journal of International Economics

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“…This results in a bias in product innovation choices. The welfare implications of this bias depend upon what 1 See Cavusgil and Sikora (1998), Cespedes et al (1988), Duhan and Sheffet (1988), Michael and College (1998), Maskus (2000), and Palia and Keown (1991). However, see Li and Maskus (2002) for a formal argument applied to process innovation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Product innovation and parallel trade

Robles

2007

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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Combating Parallel Importing: Views of US Exporters to the Asia‐Pacific Region

Cited by 26 publications

References 5 publications

Regional Monopoly and Interregional and Intraregional Competition: The Parallel Trade in Coca‐Cola Between Shanghai and Hangzhou in China

Regional Monopoly and Interregional and Intraregional Competition: The Parallel Trade in Coca‐Cola Between Shanghai and Hangzhou in China

The impact of parallel imports on investments in cost-reducing research and development

Product innovation and parallel trade

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