Collusion in experimental Bertrand duopolies with convex costs: The role of cost asymmetry

Argenton, Cédric; Müller, Wieland

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.05.006

Cited by 41 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…In this static model where firms decide simultaneously, the Nash equilibrium play implies A standard measure of collusion consists in measuring the extent to which firms manage to increase their profits above the Nash equilibrium profits and come closer to cartel profits (Holt (1995), Argenton and Müller (2012)). The collusion index (θ) is defined as follows:…”

Section: Markets Treatments and Theoretical Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This integer is drawn from a uniform distribution over [1,25]. If the integer drawn is 1, then an "event" occurs.…”

Section: Appendix (Not For Publication)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 Although production is made at the end, there are several factors that might influence the final quantity of output produced. Demand and cost uncertainty, information about competitor's planned production, capacity constraints and other reasons might make the final choice of production different from the initial plans.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Action Revision, Information and Collusion in an Experimental Duopoly Market

Roy

2017

SSRN Journal

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Section: Markets Treatments and Theoretical Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This integer is drawn from a uniform distribution over [1,25]. If the integer drawn is 1, then an "event" occurs.…”

Section: Appendix (Not For Publication)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Action Revision, Information and Collusion in an Experimental Duopoly Market

Roy

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…Boone et al (2012), who find prices close to the marginal cost of the less e cient firm, while other experimental studies on Bertrand oligopolies with asymmetric costs find prices above the Nash equilibrium (Dugar and Mitra, 2016;Argenton and Müller, 2012). An important di erence between our design and these studies is that, in our case, the entrant faces fixed costs.…”

mentioning

confidence: 91%

Hunting Unicorns? Experimental Evidence on Predatory Pricing Policies

et al. 2017

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“…5. Compared to when firms are symmetric, asymmetric costs result in lower prices (Mason et al, 1992;Mason and Phillips, 1997;Fonseca and Normann, 2008;Dugar and Mitra, 2009;Argenton and Müller, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings

Harrington

González

Kujal³

2014

SSRN Journal

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a b s t r a c tThis study conducts experiments to determine the modes of communication that are able to produce and sustain collusion and how the efficacy of communication depends on market structure. Two communication treatments are considered: non-binding price announcements and unrestricted written communication. We find that price announcements are conducive to coordinating on a high price but only under duopoly and when firms are symmetric. The standard experimental finding that collusion without communication is rare when there are more than two firms is shown to be robust to allowing firms to make price announcements. When firms are asymmetric, price announcements do result in higher prices but there is little evidence that firms are coordinating their behavior. When firms are allowed to engage in unrestricted written communication, coordination on high prices occurs for all market structures. We find that the incremental value to express communication (compared to price announcements) is greater when firms are asymmetric and there are more firms.

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Collusion in experimental Bertrand duopolies with convex costs: The role of cost asymmetry

Cited by 41 publications

References 35 publications

Action Revision, Information and Collusion in an Experimental Duopoly Market

Action Revision, Information and Collusion in an Experimental Duopoly Market

Hunting Unicorns? Experimental Evidence on Predatory Pricing Policies

The Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings

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