Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation

Saak, Alexander E.

doi:10.1093/ajae/aar154

Cited by 24 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 40 publications

(55 reference statements)

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“…Yet, research on collective reputation labels indicates peer‐monitoring within industry firms producing the legitimate product, or intra‐industry punishment schemes, should be larger to ensure food labelling fraud deterrence. Saak () shows that if peer monitoring efforts are (1) perfect and (2) information is disseminated quickly, then (3) gains from deviating are smaller compared to premiums, and (4) consumers have precise information about quality. This increases incentives to engage in collective reputation and not to defect – even with imperfect public monitoring.…”

Section: Consumer and Societal Food Fraud Costssupporting

confidence: 88%

Food fraud: economic insights into the dark side of incentives

Ehmke

Bonanno

Boys

et al. 2019

Aus J Agri & Res Econ

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In this review, we contextualise the articles in this special issue, relating them to existing food fraud research, and identify food fraud research trends, challenges and priorities for the near term. We accomplish these aims through a comprehensive review of research by food scientists, economists, other social scientists, legal experts, government research groups and international trade organisations. Existing food fraud research is heavily weighted towards food science, packaging and labelling, and legal areas of knowledge discovery. Moving forward, research is needed pertaining to general economic welfare outcomes from food fraud incidences, economic incentives to deter frauds, economic spillovers from fraud incidences to other food products and markets (domestic and international) and further delineation of the effect of different types of food fraud on consumer and producer welfare. The articles in this special issue make significant contributions to understanding of the role of food fraud in consumer decisions, measuring consumer welfare losses from fraud, food fraud spillover effects to other markets and new frameworks for fraud analysis.

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Section: Consumer and Societal Food Fraud Costssupporting

confidence: 88%

Food fraud: economic insights into the dark side of incentives

Ehmke

Bonanno

Boys

et al. 2019

Aus J Agri & Res Econ

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“…The level of trust was measured by three other variables (T ji ) in accordance with Fischer (2013) and Saak (2012). The first (T 1i ) measures the level of non-confidence in suppliers (scale 1-4); the second (T 2i ) deals with the reputation of main suppliers (scale 1-4); and the last (T 3i ) refers to the length of time of inter-firm relationships (scale 1-4).…”

Section: Variables and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fischer (2013), Van de Vrande et al (2009) and Wang and Zajac (2013) found that long-term business relationships enhance trust. Saak (2012) discusses firm reputation as being a source of trust in vertical relationships. The higher the trust among economic agents, the lower the necessity to monitor transactions through highly coordinated forms of transaction governance because of the low level of internal risks (Zak and Knack, 2001).…”

Section: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Traceability and risks: an extended transaction cost perspective

Stranieri

Orsi

Banterle

2017

SCM

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Purpose The aim of the paper is to investigate the determinants leading firms to choose among different voluntary standards within food supply chains. In specific, the authors explored the role of transaction risks, i.e. internal and exogenous risks, in the adoption of different traceability standards. Design/methodology/approach A survey was conducted within the Italian population of 216 food-processing firms that adopt voluntary traceability schemes. The identification of different transaction risks was based on the literature on supply chain management and transaction cost economics. An ordinal regression model was used in the analysis. Findings Empirical results highlight that the transaction risks perceived by food firms play a significant role on the kind of traceability schemes to adopt. There is a positive link between internal risks and the decision to implement complex schemes. Moreover, a negative relationship between the perceived exogenous risks and the complexity of the standard adopted is also observed. Exogenous transaction risk lead to the implementation of standards which do not imply strong co-ordination. On the contrary, internal risks imply complex schemes that lead to closer supply chain relationships. Research limitations/implications The analysis is limited to cross-sectional data for a single country, and further investigation would help assess the generalisation of the findings. Practical implications The analysis can be considered a useful framework to orient firms strategic decisions towards the most appropriate voluntary standard to adopt for an efficient management of vertical relationships within food supply chains. Originality/value The present analysis is the first attempt to explain the determinants leading firms to choose among different kinds of voluntary standards within food supply chains. The approach used reveals that transaction risks can be considered a useful framework to explain firms’ strategic decisions related to the kind of schemes to adopt.

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“…Therefore, the success of the GI in promoting quality among producers critically depends on the effectiveness of its certification, supervision, and knowledge management functions. In this sense, the organizational and structural characteristics of the GI (such as group size and geographical extension) have been identified as the main determinants of internal conflicts and relative GI effectiveness in governing quality (Castriota & Delmastro, 2014; Fishman et al, 2018; Saak, 2012).…”

Section: Theoretical Foundationmentioning

confidence: 99%

In search of agri‐food quality for wine: Is it enough to join a geographical indication?

2020

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This study examines whether geographical indications (GIs) truly enhance producer quality, which is a main regulatory justification for the GIs' existence. We compare the quality of wine producers with and without GIs and test for the effectiveness of GIs based on (a) the strictness of GIs' production standards and (b) GIs' organizational characteristics as a collective brand. We argue that GIs encourage producer quality because they attenuate free-riding problems, provide incentives to invest and facilitate knowledge sharing. Focusing on the Spanish wine industry, the results reveal that except for wineries with the lowest GI category (i.e., protected geographical indication), GI wineries show higher quality than non-GI wineries. We also observe that more stringent categories increase quality but at a decreasing rate. Regarding the influence of organizational features, we found that collective action problems seem to be relevant. First, above a certain threshold, the number of producers affiliated with a GI decreases the wine producer's average quality (i.e., it shows an inverted U-shaped relationship with quality). Second, GIs covering very large geographic areas are found to be less effective. [EconLit Citations: L15, Q12, Q18]. 1 | INTRODUCTION Geographical indications (GIs) constitute a central tool of European Union (EU) quality policies for the agri-food sector (Agostino & Trivieri, 2014; Josling, 2006). This aim is clearly and explicitly referred to by Article 1 of the European regulation on GIs: "The measures set out in this Regulation are intended to support agricultural and processing activities and the farming systems associated with high-quality products, thereby contributing to the achievement of rural development policy objectives" (Regulation UE1151/2012, emphasis added). Surprisingly, the economic and business literature has not studied whether GIs achieve their main objective, that is, to promote the production of high-quality products among firms. In other words, does belonging to a GI enhance the quality of the producers? This is not a trivial issue because guaranteeing the origin of a product does not necessarily guarantee the high quality (Josling, 2006). Nevertheless, this question has not often been the focus of research on GIs. Conversely, the economic debate about GIs has gone towards the appraisal of their collateral effects, focusing on their potential restrictive effects on international trade (e.g., Frantz, 2016; Meloni & Swinnen, 2018) as nontariff barriers that serve the protectionist interests of domestic agri-food industries (e.g., Landi &

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Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation

Cited by 24 publications

References 40 publications

Food fraud: economic insights into the dark side of incentives

Food fraud: economic insights into the dark side of incentives

Traceability and risks: an extended transaction cost perspective

In search of agri‐food quality for wine: Is it enough to join a geographical indication?

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