This paper examines factors explaining subcontracting decisions in the construction industry. Rather than the more common cross-sectional analyses, we use panel data to evaluate the influence of all relevant variables. We design and use a new index of the closeness to small numbers situations to estimate the extent of hold-up problems. Results show that as specificity grows, firms tend to subcontract less. The opposite happens when output heterogeneity and the use of intangible assets and capabilities increase. Neither temporary shortage of capacity nor geographical dispersion of activities seem to affect the extent of subcontracting. Finally, proxies for uncertainty do not show any clear effect. JEL codes: L22, L14, L74

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organizational relationships, focusing on their governance mechanisms and performance. He has published numerous papers and book chapters about procurement and subcontracting, particularly in transportation and construction industries. He has also extensively researched on franchising and other business networking. He also works as occasional consultant for companies and institutions on governance and organizational issues.Emmanuel Raynaud is a research fellow at INRA (department SAD) the leading French research institute dedicated to the agricultural sector. He is also the head of the pluridisciplinary research unit SADAPT. He has work extensively on various topics such as the governance of franchised chains, vertical coordination in agribusiness sectors and products' quality, the dynamics of institutions framing economic transactions. He is currently working on the procurement strategies and governance choice in institutional catering. CORRESPONDING AUTHORMarta Fernández-Barcala can be contacted at: mbarcala@uniovi.es ABSTRACT Purpose: The aim of this paper is to explain the organizational changes along supply chains when a geographical brand, i.e., a place name that has value for commercial purposes, becomes a Geographical Indication (GI).Design/methodology/approach: Employing a case study research design, this paper compares GI vs. non-GI supply chains in the EU and describes the organizational changes that occur in supply chains when a GI is adopted.Findings: When a GI is adopted, (1) an additional "public" level of governance is added along the supply chain that forces it to (2) reallocate and specialize quality controls between the public and private levels of governance to avoid redundancies and to (3) adopt more market-oriented mechanisms of governance in dyadic relationships. The paper argues that these changes occur because the private and public levels of governance complement one another.Research limitations/implications: More aspects of supply chain management (the power balance or relationship stability) and a more systematic longitudinal analysis using supply chains in various agrifood industries should be considered to generalize the conclusions. An econometric analysis formally testing the main conclusions (propositions) is also required. Practical implications:The needed changes to successfully adopt a GI are identified, and an explanatory map of these changes is offered.Originality/value: The structural governance tensions created by the use of commonpool resources within supply chains are explored. It is hypothesized, first, that when a "common-pool resource," namely a geographical name, is used in a supply chain, some type of public level of governance that promotes cooperation is required to preserve its value. Second, this public level of governance complements the dyadic mechanisms of governance, requiring the specialization and reallocation of quality controls, and the move toward more market-oriented transactions.Article Classification: Case study affecting the quality of the end produc...

This paper analyzes factors determining contractual completeness in franchising. We argue that completeness is affected by firms' contract design capabilities along with different contractual hazards. Our results support these hypotheses by showing that experienced franchisors draw up more complete contracts. Additionally, we observe that the effects of contractual hazards on completeness are not always positive and direct. There may be also a substitution effect between formal and relational governance mechanisms because risks of bilateral expropriations might serve as a mutual guarantee. This interaction also suggests that contract analysis must not only focus on particular clauses but also on the contract as a whole.

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