Collective Guilt, Collective Responsibility and the Serbs

Abstract

Can an entire nation be collectively guilty for crimes committed in its name? Focusing on the case of Serbia, this article argues that collective guilt is a morally flawed and untenable concept that should be rejected. It presents various moral and practical objections to both the generic notion of collective guilt and the more specific idea of Serbian collective guilt and contends that the latter is a fundamental impediment to peace-building and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. On what basis might it be argued that the Serbs are collectively guilty? To claim that they are collectively guilty for having supported Milošević both exaggerates levels of support for the former Serbian leader and does a major injustice to those individuals who bravely fought against the Milošević regime. Drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, the article concludes by suggesting that perhaps we can speak of Serbian collective responsibility.

Serbian Stories of Translocation: Factors Influencing the Refugee Journey Arising from the Balkan Conflicts of the 1990s

“…Such images were portrayed in international media reports about the conflicts (Clark, 2008;Sekulic, Massey, & Hodson, 2006). Seeking refuge in Serbian territory, therefore, would have resulted in a degree of acceptance in light of the public retribution experienced by the Serbian population as a whole.…”

Twenty years after 1989: moving on from transitology

“…On quite the contrary, one might speak of nearly a linear continuity, especially with regard to the study of subjects such as gender in the society (Fodor 2006, Glass 2008; property restitution and other aspects of societal transformation (Vecernik 1999, Stan 2006; the persistence of nationalism as a component of daily social discourse (Fox 2004, Clark 2008; and the contribution of non-governmental agents towards the consolidation of civic societies (Cellarius and Staddon 2002). Nevertheless, the period after the second half of the 1990s saw a greater academic interest in sociological research on marginalized groups (most commonly the East European Roma) as well as the emergence of various forms of racist violence in post-Communist Europe (Barany 2000, Mudde 2005.…”

“Patriotism à la Carte”: Perceived Legitimacy of Collective Guilt and Collective Pride as Motivators for Political Behavior

“…To wrap oneself in the former and delegitimize the latter, Coates argues, is to be selective in national memory. Discursive analyses reveal that politicians and citizens alike legitimize collective pride and delegitimize collective guilt, and some philosophers agree (e.g., Augoustinos & LeCouteur, ; Clark, ). Our goal here is to experimentally examine two questions: Do people perceive collective pride to be a more legitimate emotion than collective guilt as a basis for political actions?…”

“…People frequently conceptualize emotions in individualistic terms, and guilt is no exception. Many philosophers define guilt as a negative affective state that occurs when a person feels a sense of personal culpability for a wrongful act (Clark, ; Darby & Branscombe, ; Tollefsen, ) and that individuals should not bear moral responsibility for the wrongful actions of a group (Darby & Branscombe, ; Tollefsen, ). From this perspective, feeling collective guilt is irrational, and, if it is felt, it is only “metaphoric” guilt (Arendt, , p. 28).…”

“…Apparently the same logic does not apply: Tollefsen () notes that feeling pride on behalf of the group is uncontroversial, while guilt is. Clark () quotes a human rights activist in Serbia: “If we collectively take pride in the successes of our basketball players, for which we have no individual credit, are we entitled to reject the feeling of guilt for our ‘ethnic’ crimes in which we have not individually participated?” Clark says that this question is “based upon a flawed analogy… it is neither useful nor constructive to compare pride with guilt, since only the former can be vicarious ” (pp. 670–671, emphasis ours).…”