Collective Decision Rules and Local Debt Choice: A Test of the Median-Voter Hypothesis

McEachern, William

doi:10.1086/ntj41863105

Cited by 78 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…The pooled sample of cities in all five states clearly rejects GARP, hence the median voter hypothesis. This result contradicts much of the existing econometric evidence (Pommerehne and Frey 1976;McEachern 1978;Pommerehne 1978;Holcombe 1980;Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1982;Deno and Mehay 1987;Turnbull and Djoundourian 1994). This difference in outcomes may be driven to some extent by factors for which we have not controlled in the nonparametric tests.…”

Section: Utility Maximization Test Resultscontrasting

confidence: 62%

“…In summary, the revealed preference-based tests of the median voter hypothesis are sensitive to the degree of aggregation in the sample, institutional factors like the public sector management structure, and population density. Several studies have offered econometric evidence supporting median voter government behavior models with median income, tax share, intergovernmental aid receipts, population, and population density as common explanatory variables in their regression equations (Pommerehne and Frey 1976;Inman 1978;McEachern 1978;Pommerehne 1978;Holcombe 1980;Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1982;Deno and Mehay 1987;Turnbull and Djoundourian 1994). Similarly, this paper finds that the data are consistent with GARP.…”

Section: S Concluding Remarkssupporting

confidence: 66%

“…Similarly, HoIcombe (1980) determines that school district spending in Michigan follows the Bowen equilibrium predicted by the median voter hypothesis. McEachern (1978) concludes that state debt levels tend to follow those predicted by the median voter regression model and appear to be unaffected by whether debt issue decisions are made by direct democracy referenda or by elected representatives. Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982) similarly find support for the "as if" median voter framework for county government spending in Michigan using individual voter survey data.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 79%

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The Median Voter According to GARP

Turnbull¹,

Chang

1998

Southern Economic Journal

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This paper adapts the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) empirical method to the public goods problem to test whether observed municipal public spending can be explained “as if” the city governments maximize the utility of the median income voter. It applies the test procedure for medium‐size municipal governments in five Midwest states. The data are consistent with GARP and reveal that the local governments in the sample behave as if they maximize median voter utility once we control for the state‐specific effects, government management structure, and population density.

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Section: Utility Maximization Test Resultscontrasting

confidence: 62%

Section: S Concluding Remarkssupporting

confidence: 66%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 79%

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The Median Voter According to GARP

Turnbull¹,

Chang

1998

Southern Economic Journal

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“…Rather than focus on the effects of supermajority rules on fiscal discipline, as done by previous scholars (McEachern [1978(McEachern [ ] 2004Rafool 1996;Knight 2000), in this article, we examine the effect of supermajority rule on two different types of tax policy. We consider a tax ''narrow'' if it is levied on only a narrow portion of the population.…”

Section: Abstract Taxation Majority Rule Constitutional Economics Redistributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most of the empirical literature on supermajority rules focuses on the maintenance of fiscal discipline, not on distributive issues. McEachern ([1978]/2004) conducts one of the earliest tests and finds that debt levels are lower for states that require a supermajority of voters to approve tax increases in referenda. More recently, Rafool (1996) provides anecdotal evidence that supermajority requirements are more effective than traditional revenue limits in curbing state tax increases.…”

Section: Previous Empirical Studies On Supermajority Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes

Heckelman

Dougherty

2010

Public Finance Review

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Buchanan and Tullock argue that larger supermajority rules reduce tyranny of the majority but should have no effect on the passage of mutually advantageous policies. The authors test this argument by separately analyzing the effect of supermajority requirements on taxes that are targeted toward narrow groups (more redistributive) and taxes targeted toward a broader base (less redistributive), in a panel of fifty states from 1970 to 2008. Regression analysis reveals an inverse relationship between narrow taxes and the size of the majority rule requirement and no relationship between broad taxes and the size of the majority requirement—consistent with the claim of Buchanan and Tullock. The authors also find that Democratic controlled governments have significantly higher tax rates on narrow taxes than Republican controlled governments. The reverse is found for broad taxes, but the result is not as strong.

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Legal Constraints or Aggregate Individual Characteristics? Examining Factors of State R&D Intensity and Spending in the United States

Kim

2024

Journal of Public Affairs

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This study empirically examines the impacts of legal constraints and aggregate individual characteristics on the funding and expenditure related to states' research and development (R&D). A system generalized method of moments (GMM) analysis is performed over a 20‐year period (2000–2019). The budgetary institutions, including rainy‐day funds, TELs, and debt limitations, significantly affect states' overall innovative capacity and R&D spending. They can hinder improvements in states' innovative capacity and R&D expenditure. On the other hand, states can circumvent these institutions and increase their R&D intensity and spending. States' development and human capacity foster their innovative capacity and R&D spending. Catholic work ethic is also crucial for enhancing state governments' innovative capacity and R&D expenditure. Legislative term limits reduce states' R&D intensity and expenditure. Meanwhile, economic downturns may motivate additional spending on R&D activities to promote states' innovative capacity and R&D spending. Fiscal burdens can prevent states from investing in R&D.

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Collective Decision Rules and Local Debt Choice: A Test of the Median-Voter Hypothesis

Cited by 78 publications

References 11 publications

The Median Voter According to GARP

The Median Voter According to GARP

Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes

Legal Constraints or Aggregate Individual Characteristics? Examining Factors of State R&D Intensity and Spending in the United States

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