collective action

Olson, Mancur

doi:10.1057/9780230226203.2219

Cited by 391 publications

(523 citation statements)

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“…The formal framework for discussing social dilemmas that arise with public goods was provided by game theory [21]. As Olson stated in 1964 in his 'Logic of Collective Action' [22], self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their group interest, except when prodded by incentives directed selectively towards individuals in the group, (i.e. punishing exploiters or rewarding contributors).…”

Section: Sanctions and Social Dilemmasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans

Sigmund

2007

Trends in Ecology & Evolution

266

238

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Section: Sanctions and Social Dilemmasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans

Sigmund

2007

Trends in Ecology & Evolution

266

238

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“…In Appendix B, we construct the equilibrium for a specific case as well as a general bound independent of the geometry of the relative exposure rate σ(c s , c t ) (Theorem 6). We also show that in this model, community health is always vulnerable to free-riding [26]. (Theorem 7).…”

Section: Game Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 77%

Provisioning of Public Health Can Be Designed to Anticipate Public Policy Responses

Lindberg

Smith

et al. 2016

Bull Math Biol

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Public health policies can elicit strong responses from individuals. These responses can promote, reduce and even reverse the expected benefits of the policies. Therefore, projections of individual responses to policy can be important ingredients in policy design. Yet our foresight of individual responses to public health investment remains limited. This paper formulates a population game describing the prevention of infectious disease transmission when community health depends on the interactions of individual and public investments. We compare three common relationships between public and individual investments and explain how each relationship alters policy responses and health outcomes. Our methods illustrate how identifying system interactions between nature and society can help us anticipate policy responses.

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“…Thus, those who invest in lake management compete with all other users to obtain a share of whatever benefits their efforts generate. From a theoretical perspective, this uncertainty alone is enough to ensure the failure of the entire management effort, as in the case of the free riders that undermine collective action (Olson, 1965).…”

Section: Final Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agora Sob Nova Administração: Acordos De Pesca Nas Várzeas Da Amazônia Brasileira

2015

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A pesca fica prejudicada quando as várzeas sofrem crescentes pressões de infraestrutura, poluição, mudanças climáticas e sobrepesca. Para comunidades ribeirinhas da Amazônia, isso pode significar menos peixes nos rios e lagos, o que leva a bolsos e estômagos vazios. Este artigo usa a teoria dos recursos comuns para analisar as origens e o funcionamento dos acordos coletivos de pesca assinados por habitantes das várzeas da Amazônia brasileira. Como a pesca comercial se expandiu em meados dos anos 1990, as experiências envolvendo lagos geridos pelas comunidades locais surgiram em vários locais, como um exemplo promissor de gestão participativa de base. Os resultados mostram que os acordos geraram melhorias consideráveis, embora a sua eficácia esteja ameaçada pela fraqueza do monitoramento e da fiscalização e pela falta de eficácia da regulamentação da posse da terra. O artigo sugere que as agências governamentais devem apoiar estes acordos por meio do desenvolvimento (ou adaptação) dos mecanismos que visam a descentralização das decisões públicas e da gestão. O fracasso deles pode levar a mudanças nos processos ecológicos, à redução dos estoques pesqueiros e a conflitos sócio-ambientais.

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collective action

Cited by 391 publications

References 0 publications

Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans

Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans

Provisioning of Public Health Can Be Designed to Anticipate Public Policy Responses

Agora Sob Nova Administração: Acordos De Pesca Nas Várzeas Da Amazônia Brasileira

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