Cohabitation and Conflicting Politics in French Policymaking

Lazardeux, Sébastien G.

doi:10.1057/9781137476906

Cited by 17 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 43 publications

(61 reference statements)

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“…Other studies have observed intra-executive conflict in consolidated democracies (e.g. Lazardeux 2015; Raunio 2012) as well as in new democracies and transitional states (e.g. Beuman 2016; Sedelius and Ekman 2010).…”

Section: Theoretical Framework: Institutions and (Dis)incentives For mentioning

confidence: 97%

Shifting Power-Centres of Semi-Presidentialism: Exploring Executive Coordination in Lithuania

Raunio¹,

Sedelius²

2017

Gov. & oppos.

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Despite more than two decades of research on semi-presidential regimes, we still know very little about the actual coordination between the president and the prime minister. Through an in-depth analysis of Lithuanian semi-presidentialism, this article underscores the importance of institutional design on intra-executive balance of power. Drawing primarily on interviews with top-level civil servants and office-holders, it argues that in the absence of written rules or other strong norms guiding intra-executive coordination, presidents enjoy more discretion in designing their own modes of operation. Coordination depends on the initiative of the president, with ad hoc practices further weakening the position of the prime minister. While Lithuanian semi-presidentialism has functioned smoothly, the personality-centred politics commonly found in Central and East European countries create favourable conditions for presidential activism.

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Section: Theoretical Framework: Institutions and (Dis)incentives For mentioning

confidence: 97%

Shifting Power-Centres of Semi-Presidentialism: Exploring Executive Coordination in Lithuania

Raunio¹,

Sedelius²

2017

Gov. & oppos.

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“…Indeed, there may be good reasons for politicians motivated by re-election or policy influence not to enter into cooperation or, despite coordination mechanisms, to 'go public' with their opinion differences, especially when the two leaders represent different ideological blocs (cohabitation). For example, Lazardeux (2015) shows that in France, a regime characterized by active intra-executive coordination, particularly winning presidential elections, the main prize in French politics, have shaped the strategies of both executives.…”

Section: Conflict and Cooperation In Premier-presidential Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Largely influenced by the work of Shugart and Carey, a number of studies have established that conflict between the two executives is to be expected under semi-presidentialismboth in premierpresidential regimes (where the cabinet can only be dismissed by the parliament) and presidentparliamentary regimes (where both the president and the parliament have the formal power to dismiss the cabinet) (e.g., Elgie, 2018;Protsyk, 2005;Beuman, 2016). Intra-executive conflict is associated with negative outcomes such as cabinet instability (Sedelius and Ekman, 2010) and disruptive policy-making (Lazardeux, 2015;2017). A largely neglected variable in the comparative literature, however, is the institutional instruments for coordinating policy and executive leadership between the president and the cabinet.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presidents and Cabinets: Coordinating Executive Leadership in Premier-Presidential Regimes

Raunio

Sedelius

2019

Political Studies Review

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A key factor of semi-presidential regimes is power-sharing mechanisms between president and government. Influenced by Shugart and Carey’s seminal work on premier-presidential regimes, this article addresses intra-executive dynamics in light of recent scholarship on the risks and consequences associated with conflict and cooperation between the president and the cabinet. Through an in-depth comparison of three premier-presidential systems with broadly similar constitutional designs, Finland, Lithuania and Romania, it forces us to reconsider how coordination mechanisms and political context shape presidential influence. Absent of a working constitutional division of labour and established modes of intra-executive coordination, presidents are more likely to use alternative channels of influence – such as the strategy of ‘going public’ or direct contacts with political parties, the legislature or civil society stakeholders – and to intervene in questions falling under the competence of the government. Lack of institutionalized coordination also benefits the presidents as they hold the initiative regarding cooperation between the two executives.

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“…‘Cohabitation’ is defined as the scenario in which the president and prime minister are from different parties and the president's party is not in the cabinet (Elgie ; Elgie & McMenamin ; Samuels & Shugart ). Periods of cohabitation, such as 1986–1988, 1993–1995 and 1997–2002 in France and 1986–1995 in Portugal, are generally unstable as they increase the potential for conflict over the direction of government policy as well as the exercise of constitutional powers (Amorim Neto & Lobo ; Grossman & Sauger ; Lazardeux ) . Even in systems where presidents have weak legislative powers, they can still effectively impede the cabinet's legislative agenda.…”

Section: Presidents and The Duration Of Government Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

Savage

2017

European J Political Res

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How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi-presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, the author argues that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by their perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi-presidentialism and executive-legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors, this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non-partisan actors.

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Cohabitation and Conflicting Politics in French Policymaking

Cited by 17 publications

References 43 publications

Shifting Power-Centres of Semi-Presidentialism: Exploring Executive Coordination in Lithuania

Shifting Power-Centres of Semi-Presidentialism: Exploring Executive Coordination in Lithuania

Presidents and Cabinets: Coordinating Executive Leadership in Premier-Presidential Regimes

How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

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