Cognitive ontology in flux: the possibility of protean brains

Abstract

This paper motivates taking seriously the possibility that brains are basically protean: that they make use of neural structures in inventive, on-the-fly improvisations to suit circumstance and context. Accordingly, we should not always expect cognition to divide into functionally stable neural parts and pieces. We begin by reviewing recent work in cognitive ontology that highlights the inadequacy of traditional neuroscientific approaches when it comes to divining the function and structure of cognition. Cathy J. Price and Karl J. Friston, and Colin Klein identify the limitations of relying on forward and reverse inferences to cast light on the relation between cognitive functions and neural structures. There is reason to prefer Klein's approach to that of Price and Friston's. But Klein's approach is neurocentric-it assumes that we ought to look solely at neural contexts to fix cognitive ontology. Using recent work on mindreading as a case study, we motivate adopting a radically different approach to cognitive ontology. Promoting the Protean Brain Hypothesis, we posit the possibility that we may need to look beyond the brain when deciding which functions are being performed in acts of cognition and in understanding how the brain contributes to such acts by adapting to circumstance.

Misplacing memories? An enactive approach to the virtual memory palace

“…Yet, if functionalists surrender their commitment to the information-processing framework, then what difference is left between extended functionalist and enactivist approaches when it comes to explaining the memory palace? It seems the functionalist's metaphysical account would, to the extent to which they could explain techniques such as the memory palace in terms of bodily engagement, collapse into their competitor theories on enactivism (see Hutto, Peeters, & Segundo-Ortin, 2017). Elucidating the implications of this collapse lies beyond our current argument, but we would be interested to hear what an adapted extended functionalist story would offer that our enactivist story does not.…”

Evolving Concepts of Functional Localization

“…This could theoretically occur during different trials within a study (Khan et al., 2022), or over one's lifespan (De Brigard, 2017). If condition degeneracy is widespread, then mappings would not be stable within individuals or populations (Anderson, 2014; Hutto, Seegers, and Segundo‐Ortin, 2017).…”

“…These claims, if true, undermine localizationism as a guiding paradigm for cognitive neuroscience. Jointly, they may even signify a return to more radical forms of anti‐localizationism (Anderson, 2014; Hutto et al., 2017; Pessoa, 2022).…”

Context-sensitive computational mechanistic explanation in cognitive neuroscience

“…In the present article, we have chosen to limit our analysis of research practices as they occur in the mainstream cognitive neuroscience literature. A similar analysis of neuroscientific research practices within 4E and ecological frameworks would be a rather different enterprise and is outside the scope of the current article (for examples of work in this tradition, see Gibson, 1966;Chiel and Beer, 1997;Barrett, 2011;van Orden et al, 2012;Dotov, 2014;Anderson, 2014;Kiverstein and Miller, 2015;de Wit et al, 2017;Hutto et al, 2017;Dewhurst, 2018;Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2019;de Wit and Withagen, 2019;van der Weel et al, 2019;Ryan and Gallagher, 2020;Raja, 2021;Raja and Anderson, 2021).…”