Cognitive neuropsychology and its vicissitudes: The fate of Caramazza's axioms

Abstract

Cognitive neuropsychology is characterized as the discipline in which one draws conclusions about the organization of the normal cognitive systems from the behaviour of brain-damaged individuals. In a series of papers, Caramazza, later in collaboration with McCloskey, put forward four assumptions as the bridge principles for making such inferences. Four potential pitfalls, one for each axiom, are discussed with respect to the use of single-case methods. Two of the pitfalls also apply to case series and group study procedures, and the other two are held to be indirectly testable or avoidable. Moreover, four other pitfalls are held to apply to case series or group study methods. It is held that inferences from single-case procedures may profitably be supported or rejected using case series/group study methods, but also that analogous support needs to be given in the other direction for functionally based case series or group studies. It is argued that at least six types of neuropsychological method are valuable for extrapolation to theories of the normal cognitive system but that the single- or multiple-case study remains a critical part of cognitive neuropsychology's methods.

The Prefrontal Cortex and Neurological Impairments of Active Thought

“…Historically, researchers have tended to favour one approach and reject others. Instead, one of us (Shallice, 2015) has argued that all three approaches are legitimate, but have different potential problems, and so are more powerful in combination. This needs to be qualified, as far as prefrontal functions are concerned.…”

Identical, similar or different? Is a single brain model sufficient?

“…However, if this is so, case series and typical group studies, which mix or average behaviours over different types of individuals, can also produce misleading theoretical inferences (Badecker & Caramazza, 1985;Shallice, 2015). This issue may not be too serious a problem for minority-discrepant situations, but it would be for major-discrepancy ones.…”

“…If categorical differences over some cognitive process exist in a population, the single case approach popular in cognitive neuropsychology becomes inferentially somewhat unreliable on this issue, as phenomena found in any one individual will not be generalizable to the whole population (see Shallice, 2015 and in this issue Bartolomeo et al, 2016).…”

Neuroplasticity and the logic of cognitive neuropsychology

“…Still, critics of the cognitive neuropsychological approach frequently question whether these assumptions are correct characterizations of how the mind and brain work (e.g., Kosslyn & Van Kleek, 1990; Kosslyn & Intrilligator, 1992; Farah, 1994; Patterson & Plaut, 2009; Shallice, 2015). For example, Farah (1994) challenged whether either the brain or the mind are as modular as is typically assumed by cognitive neuropsychology, while Shallice (2015) argues that the universality assumption ignores important premorbid individual differences in functional architectures.…”

“…For example, Farah (1994) challenged whether either the brain or the mind are as modular as is typically assumed by cognitive neuropsychology, while Shallice (2015) argues that the universality assumption ignores important premorbid individual differences in functional architectures. Many of these critiques are not specific to cognitive neuropsychology, as the same assumptions are required for making inferences from other types of neuroimaging and behavioral data (see Rapp, this issue).…”