Cognitive approaches to depression: A theoretical critique

Abstract

Three cognitive approaches to depression are reviewed in terms of recent advances in cognitive psychology. The approaches considered are those based on associative networks, schemata, and explanatory styles. It is argued that each of these approaches has significant limitations that can be overcome if they are replaced by the theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983). A number of specific advantages for this theory are outlined and the basis is provided for a new cognitive approach to depression.

Social and cognitive approaches to depression: Towards a new synthesis

“…While the vulnerable individual is focusing on and working towards the valued role or goal it is possible to inhibit the negativity, self-doubt and self-depreciation that can begin to enter awareness if there is some major threat or deviation from the goal or role. The theory requires therefore that the depressive has an ambivalent model of the self (see Power, 1987, for further discussion) in which the positive aspects of the self are dominant while the goal or role is being pursued, but in which the negative aspects will come to the fore if the goal appears to be threatened or is lost.This ambivalent self-model exemplifies a so-called ' heterarchical ' as opposed to hierarchical type of organization considered previously (Power, 1987 ;Power & Champion, 1986), in which, in contrast to hierarchical organization, the superordinate to subordinate relation of elements in the structure are not fixed but may vary. When applied to an ambivalent self-model, the proposal is that under normal circumstances negative aspects of the self-model are subordinate to and inhibited from entering awareness while the dominant goal or role is intact, but these negative aspects become superordinate and inhibit the positive aspects when the goal or role is threatened or lost (Power, 1987.…”

“…A role is a social relationship in which there is a prescribed range of mutual actions; one important aspect of such social relationships in relation to the occurrence of depression is the quality of social support. Again, the quality of a social relationship can be expressed as the discrepancy between the actual state of the relationship and the desired or ideal state of that relationship (see Power, Champion & Aris, 1988); the smaller the discrepancy, then the more satisfied the individual should be with that relationship.In relation to depression, the potential advantages of a mental models approach over schema-based approaches have been considered elsewhere (Power & Champion, 1986;Power, 1987;Quelhas & Power, 1991). These advantages will be summarized with reference both to work on reasoning, which has been the main area of application of the mental models approach (e.g.…”

Personality-related disorders of interpersonal behaviour: a developmental-constructivist cognitive psychotherapy approach to treatment based on attachment theory

“…Other types of organizations, however, e.g. heterarchical (see Power and Champion (1986) for a discussion of this issue) may also be assumed. The main function of core structures is to organize knowledge about self and others, and to enable predictions (cf.…”

Counterfactual thinking and functional differences in depression

“…The aim of this research was to begin to understand the function of counterfactual thinking (CT) There is now a considerable literature on the relationship between thinking and depression that has accumulated over several decades, and that represents several different approaches to the relationship between thinking and depression (e.g., see Power & Champion, 1986;Power & Dalgleish, 2008). Some of these approaches were developed solely in the clinical context (e.g., Beck, 1976) and therefore show a lack of integration of the most recent advances in cognitive psychology.…”

“…Some of these approaches were developed solely in the clinical context (e.g., Beck, 1976) and therefore show a lack of integration of the most recent advances in cognitive psychology. These clinical-based approaches typically present an inappropriate view of, for example, reasoning in ordinary healthy individuals, and, consequently, can fail to see similarities as well as differences between reasoning in depression and reasoning in non-depressed individuals (see Champion & Power, 1995;Power & Champion, 1986;Power & Wykes, 1996;Quelhas & Power, 1991), or of reasoning in schizophrenia (e.g., Quelhas, 1987). Just to give an example, the idea that healthy non-depressed individuals reason in a logical way (e.g., see proposals by Beck, 1976, in the case of depression; Arieti, 1974 andMatte-Blanco, 1976, in the case of schizophrenia) leads to the incorrect view that reasoning performance by comparison is almost always biased in such patients.…”