Cognition in Skilled Action: Meshed Control and the Varieties of Skill Experience

Abstract

We present a synthetic theory of skilled action which proposes that cognitive processes make an important contribution to almost all skilled action, contrary to influential views that many skills are performed largely automatically. Cognitive control is focused on strategic aspects of performance, and plays a greater role as difficulty increases. We offer an analysis of various forms of skill experience and show that the theory provides a better explanation for the full set of these experiences than automatic theories. We further show that the theory can explain experimental evidence for skill automaticity, including evidence that secondary tasks do not interfere with expert performance, and evidence that experts have reduced memory for performance of sensorimotor skills.

Chess and the conscious mind: Why Dreyfus and McDowell got it wrong

“…This view resonates with Christensen, Sutton, and McIlwain's () hybrid theory of expert action, according to which skilled action encompasses both cognitive and automatic processes.…”

“…In contrast to the mindless practice of merely doing actions over and over again-such as when making coffee or driving to the office-deliberate practice encompasses working on aspects that are difficult and, after practice, analyzing one's own successes and failures or, in short, aiming to improve. Deliberate practice is well illustrated in high- 20 This view resonates with Christensen, Sutton, and McIlwain's (2016) hybrid theory of expert action, according to which skilled action encompasses both cognitive and automatic processes. 21 In Hume's words, from book II in the Treatise on Human Nature, "Reason is and ought only to be a slave to the passions."…”

Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited

“…As Fridland (2017) points out, the interface problem is also salient in recent hybrid accounts of skilled action that attempt to explain the intelligence of skill not merely by appeal to propositional knowledge or trained up dispositions, but rather by appeal to continuous interplay between control states and processes at both cognitive and motoric levels, with neither level being privileged as the locus of intelligence (e.g., Fridland, , ; Levy, ; Christensen et al, ; Papineau, ). Such accounts posit various joints at which P‐intentions and M‐intentions fluidly coordinate throughout a skilled performance.…”

Skilled action

“…McIlwain and Sutton (2015) argue that a more expansive set of self-report methods are valuable, but the potential influences of confabulation and contamination nevertheless mean that this kind of evidence should be viewed cautiously. Christensen, Sutton, and McIlwain (2016) argue that theory should be supported by converging evidence from multiple methods.…”

“…A further argument given for cognitive control in skilled action is that it is needed to provide flexibility in complex situations (McPherson & Vickers, 2004;Sutton, 2007;Sutton et al, 2011;Papineau, 2013;Furley et al, 2015;Christensen et al, 2016;Montero, 2016). Thus, Sutton (2007) describes the way in which a cricketer needs to track the changing state of the game and adjust batting strategy accordingly.…”