Coalitional Solution of a Game-Theoretic Emission Reduction Model

Abstract

In this paper the problem of allocation over time of total cost incurred by coalitions of countries in a coalitional game of pollution reduction is considered. The Nash equilibrium in the game played by coalitions is computed and then the value of each coalition is allocated according to some given mechanism between its members.

Adaptation and the Allocation of Pollution Reduction Costs

“…It would be interesting to investigate the impact of a change in the damage cost of pollution within the richer framework in Kozlovskaya et al (2010) which allows for the formation of multiple coalitions and where in a …rst stage the Nash equilibrium in the game played by coalitions is determined and in the second stage, the value of each coalition is allocated according to the Shapley value as in Petrosyan and Mamkina (2006). This promising extension is left for future research.…”

“…we have bothd ( m ; K) > 0 for all K Infmg (which impliesd min ( m ) > 0) and assumption (11) satis…ed.…”

“…Indeed we haved ( m ; K) > 0 i¤ the numerator of (21) is positive. From(11) and for S 0 0,d ( m ; K) > 0 gives 2 n + k 2 m + 4k 2 2k + 2n 2 o > 2 ( + ) ( e + S 0 ) 2 ( + ) e > 2n ;…”

“…We can now state the following proposition. It can be checked that the conditiond min ( m ) > 0 and assumption (11) are not mutually exclusive.…”

Time-Consistent Distribution Mechanism in the Game of Environmental Management

“…Applications of noncooperative differential games in environmental control are presented in [1][2][3]. Cooperative differential games in environmental control can be found in [2,[4][5][6][7][8]. We adopt the cooperative differential game to study the pollution control problem.…”