Coalition behavior: Effects of earned versus unearned resources

Miller, Charles E.; Wong, Jane Yeang Chui

doi:10.1016/0749-5978(86)90019-1

Cited by 9 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Komorita and Nagao (1983) also conclude that the predictions of the minimum resource theory are not accurate since it ignores the strategic functions of resources. Miller and Wong (1986) also found limited support for the predictions of this theory.…”

Section: Theories Of Coalition Formationmentioning

confidence: 74%

“…Though this theory initially was the focus of limited research because some of the major terms were considered ambiguous (Kahan & Rapoport, 1984), it appears that this limitation has been overcome. Miller and Wong (1986) studied the effects of earned versus unearned resources on coalition formation and concluded that the equal excess theory was not very accurate in its predictions especially when compared to the bargaining theory. Miller and Komorita (1986) found that the predictions of this theory regarding payoff divisions were in the predicted direction but predictions of frequencies of coalitions were the opposite of the empirical evidence.…”

Section: Theories Of Coalition Formationmentioning

confidence: 97%

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Conflict Management in Organizational Buying Behavior: The Role of Coalitions

Tadepalli

1992

International Journal of Conflict Management

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If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation.

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Section: Theories Of Coalition Formationmentioning

confidence: 74%

Section: Theories Of Coalition Formationmentioning

confidence: 97%

Conflict Management in Organizational Buying Behavior: The Role of Coalitions

Tadepalli

1992

International Journal of Conflict Management

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“…It was explained that together with two other persons they were taking part in an investigation into coalition formation. In the coalition game, they had had to imagine being a landowner (see also, Van Beest et al, 2003) and in order to ensure a feeling of entitlement (Miller & Wong, 1986) they were told that they could earn a parcel of land by filling out a short quiz (i.e. they were led to believe that the relative size of their parcel would be based on the comparative outcome of the quiz).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A second finding is that players with many resources are less likely to be included in a coalition than players with few resources (e.g. Miller & Wong, 1986;Murnighan, 1991). More specifically, the outcome of a coalition game is often a small resource coalition in which the payoff is allocated in proportion to resources (e.g.…”

Section: Self-interest and Equity In Coalition Formationmentioning

confidence: 96%

The interplay of self‐interest and equity in coalition formation

Beest

Dijk

Wilke

2004

Euro J Social Psych

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In this paper we investigated the interplay of self-interest and equity concerns in coalition formation by manipulating the number of units in which the coalition payoff is made available, and by manipulating the way people are allowed to interact. Results of three experiments showed that when the coalition payoff was such that members of each possible coalition could obtain an equitable payoff share, the outcome tended to be coalitions that also maximized the payoff of its members. However, when the payoff was such that people had to make trade-offs between maximizing their payoff share and obtaining an equitable payoff share, it took longer to form a coalition and it was harder to maintain a coalition. Moreover, depending on the way people were allowed to interact, the final outcome was a coalition that maximized the payoff of its members or a coalition that provided them with an equitable payoff share.

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“…That is, both the size and the position of a parcel were based on achievement. The reason why we used this achievement induction is that we felt that it would increase the importance of both factors and thus mimic real-life situations in which people typically negotiate about things that matter to them (Miller & Wong, 1986). Nevertheless, it may be fruitful to investigate whether earning resources has a different effect on coalition behaviour than earning alternatives.…”

Section: Further Researchmentioning

confidence: 98%

Resources and alternatives in coalition formation: The effects on payoff, self‐serving behaviour, and bargaining length

Beest

Dijk

Wilke

2004

Euro J Social Psych

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A consistent finding in coalition research is that the payoff of coalition members is related to (a) the resources they contribute to the coalition, and to (b) the number of alternative coalitions they can form. These two factors are, however, often intertwined. A greater number of resources tends to go hand in hand with a greater number of alternatives, leaving unanswered how both factors affect coalition behaviour. This paper attempts to clarify the interplay of resources and alternatives by disentangling the two in a newly developed coalition paradigm. Results indicated that participants base their payoff allocation on both resources and alternatives, but suggest that self-serving behaviour is more related to alternatives. Furthermore, resources and alternatives had a distinct effect on the bargaining process. It was shown that differences in alternatives led to longer bargaining.

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Coalition behavior: Effects of earned versus unearned resources

Cited by 9 publications

References 23 publications

Conflict Management in Organizational Buying Behavior: The Role of Coalitions

Conflict Management in Organizational Buying Behavior: The Role of Coalitions

The interplay of self‐interest and equity in coalition formation

Resources and alternatives in coalition formation: The effects on payoff, self‐serving behaviour, and bargaining length

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