2015
DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2015.1074605
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Co-ordination across internal organizational boundaries: how the EU Commission co-ordinates climate policies

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

0
13
0

Year Published

2016
2016
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
5
2

Relationship

1
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 12 publications
(13 citation statements)
references
References 17 publications
0
13
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Stead (2008) provides an example of low integration in terms of policy goals by arguing that the integration of transport policy is hindered by the autonomous and sectoral goal-setting by other subsystems. An example of enhanced integration of policy goals is given by Hustedt and Seyfried (2015), who show how enhanced internal coordination of climate change policies within the European Commission resulted in the adoption of climate change mitigation and adaptation goals in the policies of a number of non-traditional domains, such as energy and maritime affairs.…”
Section: Policy Goalsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Stead (2008) provides an example of low integration in terms of policy goals by arguing that the integration of transport policy is hindered by the autonomous and sectoral goal-setting by other subsystems. An example of enhanced integration of policy goals is given by Hustedt and Seyfried (2015), who show how enhanced internal coordination of climate change policies within the European Commission resulted in the adoption of climate change mitigation and adaptation goals in the policies of a number of non-traditional domains, such as energy and maritime affairs.…”
Section: Policy Goalsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The findings of this case study contribute to a comparative understanding of leaking in different political systems. The insights gained will also add to the literature on the administrative and political dynamics inside the Commission as the core executive of the European Union (Hartlapp et al 2013;Kassim et al 2013;Wille 2013 Goetz andPatz 2016;Hustedt and Seyfried 2016). Demonstrating that Pozen's observations can be transferred to the EU, the article gives rise to the argument that, in more open political and administrative systems, rules on secrecy and confidentiality are not necessarily meant to be fully effective beyond (inter)national security concerns and beyond areas of central political interest to those in power.…”
Section: "By Virtue Of Their Unvarnished Nature Leaks Have Evolved Imentioning
confidence: 77%
“…It is hypothesised that lax leak prevention is part of the 'organised hypocrisy' inside public administrations, where talk and action become organisationally decoupled (Brunsson 2006). This builds on previous public administration research on the European Commission as the EU's core executive (Hartlapp et al 2013;Hustedt and Seyfried 2016;Kassim et al 2013) and on the previous observation of decoupling in the European Commission (Boswell 2008). It is expected that the dynamics of leak prevention found in the Commission as a 'normalised' public administration (Wille 2013) are comparable to national public administrations.…”
mentioning
confidence: 75%