Co-managing common-pool resources: Do formal rules have to be adapted to traditional ecological norms?

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Co-managing common pool resources: Do formal rules have to be adapted to traditional ecological norms?Abstract: We examine the effectiveness of three democratically chosen rules that alleviate the coordination and cooperation problems inherent in collectively managed common-pool resources. In particular we investigate how rule effectiveness and rule compliance depends on the prevailing local norms and ecological values held by resource users. For this purpose, we employ a framed field experiment that is based on a rangeland model for semi-arid regions and carried out with communal farmers in Namibia and South Africa. Participants could vote for three "best practice" management rules found in many places around the world that are discussed for implementation in the study area: (temporary) private property rights, rotational grazing or limitation of livestock numbers. All rules were designed in a way that facilitated cooperation or coordination of actions. The focus of this study lies on the interactions between these rules and prevalent ecological norms exhibited in the rounds prior to rule implementation. In contrast to previous lab experimental studies, we find that democratic voting of rules is not sufficient for high rule compliance and an overall enhancement in cooperation. Rules turned out to be inefficient if they were in conflict with the prevalent ecological norm.

The evolution of norms and their influence on performance among self-governing irrigation systems in the Southwestern United States

“…Therefore, it appears that for acequias that have not been dramatically disrupted by Anglo institutions, a monitoring agent may be very important for reinforcing cooperative norms and ensuring shared benefits of self-governance as aridity worsens. However, where cooperative norms are in conflict with private rights to water among Conejos acequias, a monitoring agent enforcing private rights is associated with an increase in water use violations and lower average crop production, similar to previous findings where norms and rules conflicted (Kamran and Shivakoti 2013;Vollan et al 2013;Hoogesteger 2015). In this instance, a monitoring agent could be an impediment to successful adaptation to climate change and may even be a catalyst for changes to acequias which deviate from cooperative norms.…”

“…On balance, the literature implies that individuals who are more intrinsically competitive will likely respond with more cooperative behavior if rules enforcing cooperative behavior are in place (Ostrom 2000;Rustagi et al 2010), while individuals who are more intrinsically cooperative will likely respond with little to no increase in cooperative behavior and may even show declines due to crowding-out (Kinzig et al 2013;Rode et al 2015). This appears to be supported in the field, where externally imposed rules that are not congruent with local cooperative norms produce worse commons management (Ostrom 2000;Kamran and Shivakoti 2013;Vollan et al 2013;Hoogesteger 2015).…”

“…Cultural norms are an important and under-studied factor in the management of user-governed common pool resources (CPRs) such as irrigation systems (Poteete et al 2010;Vollan and Ostrom 2010;Vollan et al 2013). Norms are codes of behavior which are socially enforced as opposed to legally enforced; there is no prescribed punishment for violating them, but violators usually face some form of informal social punishment (Ostrom 2000).…”

Economic behavior of fishers under climate-related uncertainty: Results from field experiments in Mexico and Colombia

“…A similar result was found by Vollan et al (2013) for Namibian and South African rural herders. Such results suggest that comanagement regimes should be seriously considered for managing common-pool resources, such as fisheries.…”

Analysis of Rules in Use the Formation of Committee Boundary (PTB) State Forest Area in Indonesia

“…Based on these findings, the role of PTB in the forest area gazettment has not effectively produce the legality and legitimacy, because the rules in-use is not efficient due to conflict with the norms. The rules will not be efficient if it is contrary to the norm, it can even lead to high transaction costs in enforcement [8].…”