Co-evolutionary Game Dynamics of Competitive Cognitions and Public Opinion Environment

Liu, Haoyan; Wang, Xin; Liu, Longzhao; Li, Zhoujun

doi:10.3389/fphy.2021.658130

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…A greater relative feedback speed ε results in a greater impact on the environment, resulting in a steeper trajectory on the phase diagram. This effect of relative feedback speed is consistent with the results in reference [55].…”

Section: Interior Saddle Pointssupporting

confidence: 92%

Game-environment feedback dynamics for voluntary prisoner's dilemma games

Li¹,

Liu²,

Wu³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Recently, the eco-evolutionary game theory which describes the coupled dynamics of strategies and environment have attracted great attention. At the same time, most of the current work is focused on the classic two-player two-strategy game. In this work, we study multi-strategy eco-evolutionary game theory which is an extension of the framework. For simplicity, we'll focus on the voluntary participation Prisoner's dilemma game. For the general class of payoff-dependent feedback dynamics, we show the conditions for the existence and stability of internal equilibrium by using the replicator dynamics, respectively. Where internal equilibrium points, such as, two-strategy coexistence states, three-strategy coexistence states, persistent oscillation states and interior saddle points. These states are determined by the relative feedback strength and payoff matrix, and are independent of the relative feedback speed and initial state. In particular, the three-strategy coexistence provides a new mechanism for maintaining biodiversity in biology, ecology, and sociology. Besides, we find that this three-strategy model return to the persistent oscillation state of the two-strategy model when there is no defective strategy at the initial moment.

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Section: Interior Saddle Pointssupporting

confidence: 92%

Game-environment feedback dynamics for voluntary prisoner's dilemma games

Li¹,

Liu²,

Wu³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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“…For example, Liu and Li (2018) considered the relationship between a rumor maker and disseminators as a game and set up the Explosion-Trust (ET) Game Model. Liu et al (2021) proposed a theoretical framework to describe the co-evolution of competitive cognitions and public opinion environment using co-evolutionary game theory. Yang et al (2019) proposed a propagation model that analyzes two pieces of competitive information based on evolutionary game theory, in which each individual selects one of their friends and decides whether to imitate the strategy that the selected friend has adopted.…”

Section: Evolutionary Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Liu and Li (2018) considered the relationship between a rumor maker and disseminators as a game and set up the Explosion-Trust (ET) Game Model. Liu et al. (2021) proposed a theoretical framework to describe the co-evolution of competitive cognitions and public opinion environment using co-evolutionary game theory.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A study on the competitive dissemination of disinformation and knowledge on social media

Wang

2023

AJIM

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PurposeThe purpose of this study is to explore the evolutionary path and stable strategy for the competitive dissemination between disinformation and knowledge on social media to provide effective solutions to curb the dissemination of disinformation and promote the spread of knowledge.Design/methodology/approachBased on the social capital (SC) theory, the benefit matrix is constructed and an evolutional game model is established in this paper. Through model solving and Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB) simulation, the factors that influence disinformation-believing users (DUs) and knowledge-believing users (KUs) to choose different strategies are analyzed.FindingsThe initial dissemination willingness, the disinformation infection probability, the knowledge infection probability and the knowledge penetration probability are proved to be crucial factors influencing the game equilibrium in the competitive dissemination process of disinformation and knowledge. Moreover, some countermeasures and recommendations for the governance of disinformation are proposed.Originality/valueCurrently most research interest lies in the disinformation dissemination model but ignores the interaction between disinformation and knowledge in the diffusion process. This study reveals the dynamic mechanism of social media users disseminating disinformation and knowledge and is expected to promote the formation of cleaner cyberspace.

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“…Some studies show deficiencies in the impact analysis of parameter changes 42 , 43 .The greater the incentive of the central government is, the greater the probability of enterprises and local governments choosing environmentally friendly strategies 44 , 45 , but dynamic analysis is lacking. Only with the help of the superior government can the public play a supervisory role 46 , 47 . Increasing incentives is conducive to improving the probability of enterprises choosing green innovation 48 , 49 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

Zhou

Wang

Tang³

2022

Sci Rep

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This paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.

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Co-evolutionary Game Dynamics of Competitive Cognitions and Public Opinion Environment

Cited by 11 publications

References 67 publications

Game-environment feedback dynamics for voluntary prisoner's dilemma games

Game-environment feedback dynamics for voluntary prisoner's dilemma games

A study on the competitive dissemination of disinformation and knowledge on social media

Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

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