Climate mitigation policies and actions: access and allocation issues

Ivanova, Antonina; Zia, Asim; Ahmad, Paiman; Lima, Mairon G. Bastos

doi:10.1007/s10784-020-09483-7

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Second, treaties that are considered unfair may be hard to implement. Lessons from case studies show that people may not accept a distribution that is considered unfair, even if there is a cost of not accepting (Ivanova et al, 2020). Such assessment indicates the importance of policy as a driver of change at multiple levels and across many actors, with potential for benefits as well as costs at many levels.…”

Section: Paris Agreement Addis Ababa Action Agenda and Sustainable Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Considered from this angle, SD aims at achieving social progress, environmental equilibrium and economic growth (Zhai and Chang, 2019). Exploring the demands of SD, Ivanova et al (2020) emphasized the need to move away from harmful socio-economic activities and rather engage in activities with positive environmental, economic and social impacts.…”

Section: Paris Agreement Addis Ababa Action Agenda and Sustainable Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The particular context, however, is that the biggest problem in climate finance is likely to be in developing countries, even in the presence of such enabling policies and quite apart from any other considerations such as equity and climate justice (Klinsky et al, 2017) or questions about the equitable allocations of future 'climate budgets' (Ivanova et al, 2020). The differentiation between developed and developing countries matter most on financing.…”

Section: Higher Public Spending Levels Driven By the Impacts Of Covid-19mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Finance for Climate Action: Postcovid-19 Recovery Challenges

Ivanova¹

2021

REMEF

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This paper is oriented to explore the new developments in climate action financing within the framework of Just Transition. This discourse is linked to the post COVID-19 recovery and the sustainable finance agenda. The study is done through extensive literature review, combining aspects PRISMA guidelines and the Recursive Content Abstraction (RCA) analytical approach. After presenting the Just Transition framework, we analyze the provisions on financing of the Paris Agreement. Next, the financing gaps are identified with the COVID -19 impact. We pay a special attention on the debt service, the related developing countries difficulties, and the challenges for sub-national governments. Then we analyze the efficient market theory and its distortion in the time of COVID-19 crisis. Based on the topics discussed, at the end the paper presents some final remarks.

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Section: Paris Agreement Addis Ababa Action Agenda and Sustainable Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Paris Agreement Addis Ababa Action Agenda and Sustainable Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Higher Public Spending Levels Driven By the Impacts Of Covid-19mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Finance for Climate Action: Postcovid-19 Recovery Challenges

Ivanova¹

2021

REMEF

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“…Article 6.2 suggests ITMOs can originate from a variety of sources including regional carbon markets or REDD+. While this provision, unlike similar provisions in the Kyoto Protocol, does not create an international carbon market, it enables parties to pursue this option should they choose to do so, for example, through the linking of domestic or regional carbon markets (Ivanova et al 2020). Article 6.2 could also be implemented in other ways, including direct transfers between governments, linkage of mitigation policies across two or more parties, sectoral or activity crediting mechanisms, and other forms of cooperation involving public or private entities or both (Linn 2016).…”

Section: Sustainable Development Mechanism (Sdm) Of the Paris Agreementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blue Carbon in Emissions Markets: Challenges and Opportunities for Mexico

Ivanova

Bermudez-Contreras

2021

Springer Climate

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Mangroves are ecosystems made up of trees or shrubs that develop in the intertidal zone and provide many vital environmental services for livelihoods in coastal areas. They are a habitat for the reproduction of several marine species. They afford protection from hurricanes, tides, sea-level rise and prevent the erosion of the coasts. Just one hectare of mangrove forest can hold up to 1,000 tons of carbon dioxide, more than tropical forests and jungles. Mexico is one of the countries with the greatest abundance of mangroves in the world, with more than 700,000 ha. Blue carbon can be a novel mechanism for promoting communication and cooperation between the investor, the government, the users, and beneficiaries of the environmental services of these ecosystems, creating public–private-social partnerships through mechanisms such as payment for environmental services, credits, or the voluntary carbon market. This chapter explores the possibilities of incorporating blue carbon in emissions markets. We explore the huge potential of Mexico’s blue carbon to sequester CO2. Then we analyse the new market instrument that allows countries to sell or transfer mitigation results internationally: The Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM), established in the Paris Agreement. Secondly, we present the progress of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) to standardize the methodologies to assess their stock and determine the magnitude of the blue carbon sinks. Thirdly, as an opportunity for Mexico, the collaboration with the California cap-and-trade program is analysed. We conclude that blue carbon is a very important mitigation tool to be included in the compensation schemes on regional and global levels. Additionally, mangrove protection is an excellent example of the mitigation-adaptation-sustainable development relationship, as well as fostering of governance by the inclusion of the coastal communities in decision-making and incomes.

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“…There have been attempts to achieve an effective aggregate emission reduction target via international cooperation. The international agenda for mitigation and sustainable development becomes more specific with Paris Accord and 2030 agenda for sustainable development which reflects the recognition that can mutually achieve the goals of sustainable development and climate mitigation (Ivanova et al 2020). Climate justice addresses the disproportionate effect of climate change on population and community sovereignty (Tramel 2016) and researchers have agreed that climate change and global warming' main source is energy consumption (Ahmad et al , 2019.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rewards and penalties in an evolutionary game theoretic model of international environmental agreements

Luqman

Soytaş

et al. 2021

Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja

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The UNFCC on climate change specifies that all nations must follow the rule of 'common' with differentiation regarding their responsibilities for the protection of the global environmental system. Recently, the formulation and stability of the IEA have been increased in the literature by applying the concept of game theory to make the climate agreements successful at the national and the international level. This study provides a novel evolutionary game theoretic model of self-enforcing IEA to overcome the free rider problem. The fundamental difference between our paper and existing literature is that we examine enforcement within a model as IEA has a governing authority while the typical model of enforcement involves a government enforcing a rule that it has imposed. For this purpose, we assign countries into different grades according to their pollution levels, consider a combination of rewards and penalties, use replicator dynamics to derive the conditions for the population steady state, and examine how the proposed regulatory mechanism fares in this steady state. This framework enables us to avoid the free rider and renegotiation problems as well as the rationality assumption. We establish the condition for evolutionary stability. The global environmental problem is managed effectively as a reward-punishment scheme and the monitoring frequency of IEA fulfills this condition. Our results provide an allocation principal with stable conditions under which countries get more benefits by monitoring the IEA and stability of the grand coalition holds.

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Climate mitigation policies and actions: access and allocation issues

Cited by 15 publications

References 59 publications

Finance for Climate Action: Postcovid-19 Recovery Challenges

Finance for Climate Action: Postcovid-19 Recovery Challenges

Blue Carbon in Emissions Markets: Challenges and Opportunities for Mexico

Rewards and penalties in an evolutionary game theoretic model of international environmental agreements

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