Clerks or Kings? Partisan Alignment and Delegation to the US Bureaucracy

Palus, Christine Kelleher; Yackee, Susan Webb

doi:10.1093/jopart/muw001

Cited by 19 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…To move this literature forward, scholars ought to consider a greater emphasis on empirical research conducted on and across the American states. As Palus & Yackee (2016) demonstrate, old theories-in their case, an investigation of autonomy and an ultimate questioning of the socalled "allied principal"-can often be assessed with a richer set of contextual factors when looking across the states and over time. A greater emphasis on subnational governments will allow future researchers to include variation on the institutional structures, as well as partisan configurations, to add to our understanding of how such political arrangements may or may not affect agency autonomy.…”

Section: Pl22ch02_yackeementioning

confidence: 99%

The Politics of Rulemaking in the United States

Yackee

2019

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

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Rulemaking is a critical part of American government and governance. This article reviews the political underpinnings of modern rulemaking. Specifically, it highlights the process and impact of agency regulations, as well as the key tools used by the legislature, elected executive, and courts to oversee the rulemaking process. The article also reviews who participates in the rulemaking process, as well as who influences regulatory content. Finally, new directions in regulatory policymaking are explored, including data collection advancements, as well as the potential role for guidance documents as replacements for more traditionally issued notice and comment regulations.

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Section: Pl22ch02_yackeementioning

confidence: 99%

The Politics of Rulemaking in the United States

Yackee

2019

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

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“…There is extensive literature both in political science and legal studies that supports the notion that bureaucrats (the rule making agency) have preferences that may or may not be aligned with those of Congress, or the private agents they regulate. Such preferences need not be ideological, but also pragmatic and implementation oriented since the agency beyond rule-making is also in charge of enforcement [10, 11, 17, 30–33]. This suggests that the agency (e.g.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The general topic of regulation has been addressed by various communities, where some key issues investigated include the role of public comments on influencing final rules [8–11], whether excessive procedural and bureaucratic constraints due to the APA create significant delay of regulation formation (the so-called “ossification theory” [12, 13]), and whether regulatory agencies speed up or slow down creation of regulations strategically according to the political environment [14]. With few recent exceptions [15–17], previous empirical analyses of the public comment rule-making process utilized surveys, interviews of comment writers and/or government workers, or teams of individuals to manually code several proposed and final rules and their corresponding comments in order to quantitatively investigate whether and how rules evolved.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the formation of Dodd-Frank Act derivatives regulations

2019

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Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis, governments around the world passed laws that marked the beginning of new period of enhanced regulation of the financial industry. These laws called for a myriad of new regulations, which in the U.S. are created through the so-called notice-and-comment process. Through examining the text documents generated through this process, we study the formation of regulations to gain insight into how new regulatory regimes are implemented following major laws like the landmark Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Due to the variety of constituent preferences and political pressures, we find evidence that the government implements rules strategically to extend the regulatory boundary by first pursuing procedural rules that establish how economic activities will be regulated, followed by specifying who is subject to the procedural requirements. Our findings together with the unique nature of the Dodd-Frank Act translate to a number of stylized facts that should guide development of formal models of the rule-making process.

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“…Rigby's (2012) study of state-level implementation of the US federal government's Affordable Care Act 2010 provides a partial exception, demonstrating as it does that Democrat-controlled states were significantly more likely to implement required legislation and reform to support the implementation of the Federal-level Democratic government's policy. 4 Also in relation to the United States, we have seen that partisan alignment between governing party and elected justices significantly influence outcomes of cases involving government agencies (Thrower, 2017) and that partisan alignment between governing party and the head of a governing agency may shape the degree of delegated authority granted to that agency (Palus and Yackee, 2016). This scholarship suggests that partisan alignment may influence policy outcomes.…”

Section: Extending Scholarship On Partisan Alignment: Policy Outcomes and Inter-party Variationsmentioning

confidence: 91%

Taking one for the team: Partisan alignment and planning outcomes in England

Clegg

2021

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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Does partisan alignment affect sub-national political units’ performance? When testing for a partisan alignment effect, local authority planning processes represent a ‘hard case’. Formally, decision-making processes are insulated against political considerations, and there is a mis-match between national party commitments to expand house-building on the one hand, and pressure on local councillors from residents opposing new developments on the other. I find that, in general, partisan alignment brings an increased propensity to approve large residential planning applications. This suggests councillors’ willingness to ‘take one for the team’ by prioritising national over local interests. Consistent with ‘party politics of housing’ insights, inter-party variation sees an altered effect in left-wing constellations, which display lowered approval propensities. In addition to these substantive extensions to scholarship on partisan alignment effects, the insights presented into the drivers of variation in local authority planning outcomes contribute to the pressing tasks of understanding and addressing the chronic under-supply of new housing within the English housing system.

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Clerks or Kings? Partisan Alignment and Delegation to the US Bureaucracy

Cited by 19 publications

References 54 publications

The Politics of Rulemaking in the United States

The Politics of Rulemaking in the United States

On the formation of Dodd-Frank Act derivatives regulations

Taking one for the team: Partisan alignment and planning outcomes in England

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