Class and social policy in the knowledge economy

Abstract

Recent studies of welfare state attitudes in the knowledge economy find very high generalized support for generous welfare state policies, both among the working and the middle classes. Has class become irrelevant as a predictor of social policy preferences? Or do we simply mis-conceptualise today's class conflict over social policy?To what extent has it changed from a divide over the level of social policy generosity to a divide over the kind of social policy and -more specifically -over the relative importance that should be given to different social policies? Answering these questions is not only relevant to understand welfare politics in the twenty-first century, but electoral politics as well: only when we understand what working-and middle-class voters care about, can we evaluate the role distributive policies play in electoral processes. We use original survey data from eight West European countries to show that middle-and working-class respondents indeed differ in the relative importance they attribute to social investment and social consumption policies. Middle-class respondents consistently attribute higher absolute and relative importance to social investment. We also show that this emphasis on investive policies relates to the middle class expecting better future economic and social opportunities than the working class. This divide in anticipated opportunities underlies a new kind of working-versus middle-class divide, which contributes to transforming the class divide from a conflict over the level of social policy to a conflict over the priorities of social policy.

Intersections of class, lifestyle and politics. New observations from Norway

“…A growing body of research has documented that these fractions of the middle class exhibit quite distinct voting patterns, similar to those documented by Bourdieusian scholars (see e.g. Ares 2020;Häusermann et al 2022;Oesch and Rennwald 2018;Vestin and Oskarson 2017). This convergence suggests that these empirical patterns are quite robust, even when using different theoretical and methodological approaches (although the interpretations and explanations of these patterns differ).…”

Does fiscal pressure constrain policy responsiveness? Evidence from Germany

“…Hence, they will be less opposed to cutting such expenditure. As has been shown by several authors, workers and lower income groups indeed show stronger preferences for re-distribution and state intervention than the better-off (Beramendi et al, 2015) -and preference differences become even more pronounced when people are confronted with fiscally induced trade-offs (Busemeyer & Garritzmann, 2017;Häusermann et al, 2021). What is more, people with lower incomes and low subjective economic well-being tend to oppose fiscal consolidation measures more strongly than the better-off (Hayo & Neumeier, 2017;Stix 2013).…”

The World Politics of Social Investment: Volume II

“…e educated middle class, especially in the post-industrial, public, and semi-public sectors, tends to be both the key electorate of the New Le and the key advocate of social investment policies (Beramendi et al, 2015;Garritzmann et al, 2018;Häusermann & Palier, 2017;see Chapter 12 in this volume). Evidence points to a range of explanations for this: from its universalistic values to economic opportunities to political trust and to a self-interest in the expansion of (semi-)public services (Busemeyer & Garritzmann, 2017;Häusermann et al, 2021;Kitschelt & Rehm, 2013). On the other hand, both the petty bourgeoisie and voters of the skilled working class and lower middle class are champions of social protectionism, as well as the key constituencies of the far right (Häusermann et al, 2020;Oesch & Rennwald, 2018;Zhen et al, 2019).…”

“…Let us rst discuss the role of institutional legacies. While in the more advanced, mature welfare states of Western democracies, social investment is o entimes conceptualized in terms of a "further development" or "next stage" relative to the preceding compensation-oriented welfare state (Hemerijck, 2017;Morel et al, 2012)-a stage ridden with hard choices and trade-o s (Garritzmann et al, 2018;Häusermann et al, 2021)-a mature welfare state is not a precondition for the politicization of social investment. ere is no reason to assume that welfare states would necessarily have to go through a phase of "compensation maturation" for social investment to be politicized or that such a compensation-oriented phase would necessarily lead to the politicization of social investment.…”

“…high-skilled more generally, we would expect socioculturally progressive new le parties to place stronger emphasis on inclusive social investment, whereas more industrial worker-oriented le parties might prioritize social compensation and act merely as consenters to inclusive social investment reforms (Beramendi et al, 2015;Häusermann et al, 2021).…”