Clarifying the End of Cold War Debate

Abstract

Archie Brown belongs to that small, distinguished and deservedly proud band of Sovietologists who saw early on that Mikhail Gorbachev recognized the need for major changes in domestic and foreign policy. His eloquently argued and richly documented book The Gorbachev Factor remains the landmark study of the Soviet leader's role in the tumultuous events of the USSR's last years. This distinguished record of analysis and scholarship makes him arguably the leading proponent of the view that Gorbachev played a decisive causal role in bringing about the Cold War's end. In a recent article in these pages, Brown repeats his underlying argument about Gorbachev's key role and seeks to strengthen it by showing that it is far superior to alternative explanations, especially 'the interpretation of some who regard themselves as Realists or Neo-Realists in the study of international relations' (p. 2). Brown cites our work as the exemplar of this interpretation and uses it as his main foil. 1 The news that our research failed to change Brown's basic view of Gorbachev's role is hardly surprising. The end of the Cold War is clearly one of those momentous events whose explanation will always be a matter of debate. But such debates may be more or less illuminating, depending on the degree to which scholars actually engage each other's arguments and evidence. What prompted us to respond to Brown's article was the somewhat disheartening degree to which it seemed to be a case of scholarly ships passing in the night. Whatever its faults, our explanation grappled directly with alternative explanations highlighting the role of individuals, ideas and domestic politics. Brown's article does not engage our research in a similarly rigorous manner. As a result, it remains unclear how much Brown really disagrees with us about the causes of this momentous event, and, if so, exactly why. Our purpose here is to try to remedy this situation.

Losing Face and Sinking Costs: Experimental Evidence on the Judgment of Political and Military Leaders

“… 49. On the perception of power in IR theory, see Morgenthau 1948. For an example from empirical IR, see Brooks and Wohlforth 2006 on declining power as experienced by Gorbachev during the late 1980s. …”