Christchurch in the context of New Zealand terrorism and right wing extremism

Law’s response to New Zealand’s ‘darkest of days’

“…71 But there is also evidence that the New Zealand intelligence community was alive to the threat of right-wing extremism and that there was 'no obvious double standard' in how it was dealt with. 72 Moreover, the fact that the 15/3 attack occurred does not in itself show that there was an intelligence failure or a disproportionate focus on Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Given the imperfect nature of intelligence, attacks can still succeed even if intelligence agencies are alive to a particular threat.…”

Security sector practitioner perceptions of the terror threat environment before the Christchurch attacks

“…New Zealand's Terrorist Suppression Act (TSA) 2002 has been regarded by security sector practitioners as largely ineffective since the Solicitor General David Collins declined authorisation to prosecute several individuals arrested during the Operation Eight actions against activists alleged to have been running 'militant training' camps in the Urewera in 2007. Key faults of the TSA include its convoluted definitions of 'a terrorist act' and 'a terrorist group' as well as the applicability of the TSA to suspected conspiracies to carry out a terrorist attack if discovered before it occurred (Battersby and Ball 2019). In 2009 Collins explained his view that in Operation Eight, the NZ Police had 'successfully brought to an end what were very disturbing activities' and that deficiencies in the law had been a key component of the decision not to charge despite the fact that a number of those arrested had come close to meeting the criteria for prosecution.…”

“…Such warnings given by NZSIS were stopped in 2014 after the Inspector General of Intelligence questioned their legality, and were resumed a few years later, but under strict guidelines (Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 2017). In cases where evidence of offending was available police also utilised warnings, or criminal investigations could be undertaken and prosecutions followed if appropriate (Battersby and Ball 2019). A small number of 'fixated' individuals who have made threats or undertook threatening actions against political leaders have been prosecuted and convicted of criminal offences (NZ Herald 2007;RNZ 2019 May 26).…”

“…Drawing from Sam Mullins' (2016) work looking at Australian CT practitioner perspectives, this study set out to discover the nature of New Zealand practitioner perspectives across the various government agencies for which CT was a concern, and consider the impact on them of the 'low threat' environment they operated in. While there are several studies concerning general aspects of New Zealand's national security, counter terrorism has attracted much less attention (Greener-Barcham 2002;Ip 2016;Battersby 2017Battersby , 2018Battersby and Ball 2019) and nothing yet has focused on practitioner's perspectives of the work they do. This article seeks to address that gap.…”

Official access to encrypted communications in New Zealand: Not more powers but more principle?

“…limited. 1 Further, the most prominent instance of a fatal and politically motivated attack in recent New Zealand history, the bombing of the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior in July 1985 in a New Zealand port, was not a terrorist act. Instead, it was found to have been committed by French government intelligence personnel, two of whom were subsequently convicted of manslaughter under general New Zealand criminal law.…”