Choosing Sides: Economic Interdependence and Interstate Disputes

International Migration and Military Intervention in Civil War

“…Briefly discussing the results of our control covariates, our findings are largely in line with previous studies (e.g., Koga, 2011;Kathman, 2011;Mitchell, 1970;Finnemore, 2004;Weiss, 2012;Regan, 1998;Lemke and Regan, 2004;Aydin, 2008;Findley and Marineau, 2015). Due to space limitations, we focus on the statistically significant variables only.…”

“…This is consistent with the definition of intervention we use (Regan, 1998). It also mirrors research on the material incentives for intervention, which finds that the intervener needs to stabilize a region to protect trading partners and the production of valuable goods (e.g., Aydin, 2008;Bove, Gleditsch and Sekeris, 2015). Hence, who is involved in a war, interveners' connection to them, or interveners' bias toward who ought to win that conflict, is of minor importance in this research.…”

“…Moreover, interventions in conflicts with large refugee flows are frequently backed by by international law (Dowty and Loescher, 1996). On the other hand, strategic and economic interests, e.g., the access to natural resources, may be pivotal in encouraging third parties to intervene (e.g., Lemke and Regan, 2004;Aydin, 2008;Findley and Marineau, 2015;Bove, Gleditsch and Sekeris, 2015), in particular if they are major powers (e.g., Gent, 2007). …”

“…Our set of control covariates follows those previous studies we discussed in the literature review above (e.g., Koga, 2011;Kathman, 2011;Mitchell, 1970;Finnemore, 2004;Weiss, 2012;Regan, 1998;Lemke and Regan, 2004;Aydin, 2008;Findley and Marineau, 2015). Hence, we include the polity2 scores of the Polity IV data for both the potentially intervening country (Third-Party Democracy) and the country at war (Conflict Democracy).…”

“Oil above Water”

“…A number of studies find evidence of a direct effect on the risk of civil war from oil dependence, usually measured by oil exports as a share of a country's GDP (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004;Ross, 2006). 2 There is also a large related liter-1 Notable exceptions that consider economic incentives for intervention include Aydin (2008;2012), who examines the incentives to protect trading partners in interstate disputes and civil wars, and Koga (2011), who looks at how lootable natural resources such as secondary diamonds increase the likelihood of third party intervention in civil war by autocracies. 2 The claim that oil invites civil conflict has been challenged by some researchers.…”