“…It includes case studies and experimental analyses that use the game theory of common property regimes as their theoretical framework (Ostrom 1990(Ostrom , 200018 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994;Ostrom et al 2002;Varughese and Ostrom 2001). Other work includes Acheson (1975Acheson ( , 1988Acheson ( , 2003; Wade (1988); Berkes et al (1989); Baland and Platteau (1996; Bardhan (2000); Dayton-Johnson (2000a, 2000b; Gardner et al (2000); Chermak and Krause (2002); Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002); Acheson and Gardner (2005); Faysse (2005); Adhikari and Lovett (2006); Ruttan (2008); and Deacon, Parker, and Costello (2013). The empirical cases cover groundwater basins, communal irrigation systems, local forest lands, pastures, inshore or artisanal fisheries, and offshore regional fisheries.…”