Choosing rules to govern the commons: a model with evidence from Mexico

Dayton-Johnson, Jeff

doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00073-1

Cited by 46 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…This sort of analysis also confronts differences in conceptualization and the empirical measurement of variables by different authors. Some researchers have collected data on relatively large sets of cases (Bardhan 2000;Dayton-Johnson 2000;Lam 1998;Jodha 1990;Shivakoti and Ostrom 2002). Ultimately, since there are limits to the time and financing available for data collection, a trade-off exists between the number and type of variables measured and the number of cases for which data can be collected.…”

Section: Ifri and The Challenge Of Comparable Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

In pursuit of comparable concepts and data about collective action

Poteete

Остром

2004

Agricultural Systems

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Section: Ifri and The Challenge Of Comparable Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

In pursuit of comparable concepts and data about collective action

Poteete

Остром

2004

Agricultural Systems

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“…the fact that congruence between appropriation rules and local conditions of the commons is associated with successful governance of the commons (Ostrom, 1990). 16 Dayton-Johnson (2000a) provides a model of sharing rules and inequality and references to empirical literature that demonstrate effectiveness of proportional sharing rules (p. 20). An empirical analysis by Bardhan (2000) on rural irrigation management in South India also supports the finding about inequality and harvest sharing rules.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inequality and outside options in common-property resource use

Tarui

2007

Journal of Development Economics

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“…It includes case studies and experimental analyses that use the game theory of common property regimes as their theoretical framework (Ostrom 1990(Ostrom , 200018 Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994;Ostrom et al 2002;Varughese and Ostrom 2001). Other work includes Acheson (1975Acheson ( , 1988Acheson ( , 2003; Wade (1988); Berkes et al (1989); Baland and Platteau (1996; Bardhan (2000); Dayton-Johnson (2000a, 2000b; Gardner et al (2000); Chermak and Krause (2002); Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002); Acheson and Gardner (2005); Faysse (2005); Adhikari and Lovett (2006); Ruttan (2008); and Deacon, Parker, and Costello (2013). The empirical cases cover groundwater basins, communal irrigation systems, local forest lands, pastures, inshore or artisanal fisheries, and offshore regional fisheries.…”

Section: Local Cprs and Transaction Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations

Libecap

2014

Journal of Economic Literature

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Is there a way to understand why some global environmental externalities are addressed effectively, whereas others are not? The transaction costs of defining the property rights to mitigation benefits and costs is a useful framework for such analysis. This approach views international cooperation as a contractual process among country leaders to assign those property rights. Leaders cooperate when it serves domestic interests to do so. The demand for property rights comes from those who value and stand to gain from multilateral action. Property rights are supplied by international agreements that specify resource access and use, assign costs and benefits including outlining the size and duration of compensating transfer payments, and determining who will pay and who will receive them. Four factors raise the transaction costs of assigning property rights: (i) scientific uncertainty regarding mitigation benefits and costs; (ii) varying preferences and perceptions across heterogeneous populations; (iii) asymmetric information; and (iv) the extent of compliance and new entry. These factors are used to examine the role of transaction costs in the establishment and allocation of property rights to provide globally valued national parks, implement the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, execute the Montreal Protocol to manage emissions that damage the stratospheric ozone layer, set limits on harvest of highly-migratory ocean fish stocks, and control greenhouse gas emissions.

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Choosing rules to govern the commons: a model with evidence from Mexico

Cited by 46 publications

References 13 publications

In pursuit of comparable concepts and data about collective action

In pursuit of comparable concepts and data about collective action

Inequality and outside options in common-property resource use

Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations

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