Choosing Electoral Rules: Theory and Evidence from US Cities

Abstract

This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation.Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the South), we show why majorities tend to adopt "winner-take-all" city-wide rules (at-large elections) in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small. In this case, for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede representation to voters from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority becomes larger (closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be confined in minority-packed districts. Single-member district rules serve this purpose. We show empirical results consistent with these implications of the model.

Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms

“…Finally, we have considered institutions as predetermined in this paper, but institutions (for example, forms of government) may be endogenous to the same type of socioeconomic conflict that causes crisis and determines stabilizations. This is a point raised in related literature by Aghion, Alesina, andTrebbi (2004 and2005) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004). This point also relates to the "normative" question about institutional choice.…”

“…We should make clear that these results do not imply that certain types of government are inherently superior to others: the ability to stabilize is only one of the features that a society may require in a government, but there are certainly others, such as fairness, responsiveness to changes in society's preferences, and checks and balances. Spolaore (2004) and Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) have recently discussed this kind of trade-off in a context related to that of the present paper.…”

Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments

“…17 Aghion et al (2005) endogenize the choice of electoral rules in U.S. cities in a very similar fashion. Here, the external shock is the general enlargement of the franchise to minorities.…”