Choosing and sharing

Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility

“…Replicating the proof of Proposition 1, the constraints for building coalitions can be restricted to {N \S|S ∈N }. However, the constraints for non-building coalitions cannot be reduced to individual rationality: an allocation x is in the R-core C R if and only if i∈N x i = v(N ) (14) ∀S ∈ N B, i∈S x i ≥ v R (S) (15) ∀i ∈ N,x i ≥ b i …”

A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods

“…If the host selection criteria combine suitability and public good size, mechanisms tackling the siting problem may lose their truthful revelation properties because potential hosts may distort their messages to avoid the local harm. Solutions in this direction select the host first and, in a further stage, the other communities determine the size-dependent https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104953 Received 27 January 2023; Received in revised form 20 July 2023; Accepted 21 July 2023 compensation (Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux, 2011). Nonetheless, such informational requirements are equivalent to knowing ex ante who the most suitable host is.…”

Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogenous Tasks and NIMBY Problems

“…Our paper is related to a strand of literature that covers the siting problem of noxious facilities (see, e.g., Perez‐Castrillo and Wettstein ; Minehart and Neeman ; Laurent‐Luchetti and Leroux ; Sakai ). The papers in this literature generally focus either on implementing the efficient outcome in Nash equilibrium (hence, requiring complete information) or on budget balance rather than assignment efficiency.…”