2013
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12031
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Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogenous Tasks and NIMBY Problems

Abstract: We study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. We restrict our attention to incentive-compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect the identical preferences lower bound: each agent should be at least as well off as in a hypothetical economy where all agents have the same preference as hers, no agent envies another, and the budget is balanced.

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Cited by 13 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…Other measures proposed to identify optimal host regions or communities and necessary compensation payments, like auctions [98][99][100] and mechanism design approaches [101,102] find little consideration. They abstract from essential geographic conditions, like wind, sun, land or local demand and again, they can crowd-out community motivations to support RES-E more generally [96].…”
Section: Policy Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Other measures proposed to identify optimal host regions or communities and necessary compensation payments, like auctions [98][99][100] and mechanism design approaches [101,102] find little consideration. They abstract from essential geographic conditions, like wind, sun, land or local demand and again, they can crowd-out community motivations to support RES-E more generally [96].…”
Section: Policy Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The mechanisms in E appear to be also appealing alternatives to the Pivotal mechanisms 15 which violate some important fairness axioms such as egalitarian-equivalence, solidarity,  −bounded-deficit, and population monotonicity (as population decreases, no one benefits, see Yengin, 2011c). On the other hand, we can design Egalitarian mechanisms that satisfy all of these axioms.…”
Section: Comparison Of Our Results With the Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…the absence of the need to determine the level of production of the objects is crucial. Note that our model can also be applied to problems where agents privately supply discrete public goods (see Yengin, 2011b, for more details). Assume that there is no question of whether or how much of each public good is to be provided (e.g., building a waste disposal site, siting state capitals).…”
Section: Comparison Of Our Results With the Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
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