2005
DOI: 10.1177/1470594x05049434
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Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality

Abstract: Many recent political philosophers have attempted to demonstrate that choice and responsibility can be incorporated into the framework of an egalitarian theory of distributive justice. This article argues, however, that the project of developing a responsibility-based conception of egalitarian justice is misconceived. The project represents an attempt to defuse conservative criticism of the welfare state and of egalitarian liberalism more generally. But by mimicking the conservative’s emphasis on choice and re… Show more

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Cited by 156 publications
(81 citation statements)
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“…We may have reason to secure an equal distribution of resources and we may have reason to ensure certain relations. Under some conditions, the two claims may even be supportive, such that we have reason to secure an equal distribution of resources because we have reason to ensure certain relations (Anderson, 1999: 313-14;Scheffler, 2005). Our third aim is to delve deeper into this possibility, as well as more generally to explore the complex relationship between these two types of reasons.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We may have reason to secure an equal distribution of resources and we may have reason to ensure certain relations. Under some conditions, the two claims may even be supportive, such that we have reason to secure an equal distribution of resources because we have reason to ensure certain relations (Anderson, 1999: 313-14;Scheffler, 2005). Our third aim is to delve deeper into this possibility, as well as more generally to explore the complex relationship between these two types of reasons.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Samuel Scheffler has pointed out, this distributive formula must be part of a larger normative theory 20. Unless the category of choice is explained as distinctive in a way that makes it a privileged indicator of the fairness or unfairness of an outcome, it is difficult to understand why it should have such a fundamental importance as it has within luck-egalitarianism.…”
Section: Discussion: Individual Responsibility Rejected?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Anderson criticizes this approach because the concept of eligibility of compensation is grounded in the assumption of inferiority. The assumption that some people are inferior to others points not to humanitarian concerns but to concerns of pity (5,7,8). The discourse of compensation is viewed as disrespect to vulnerable and/or disabled human beings because it implies that able people are superior.…”
Section: Arguments Against Luck Egalitarianismmentioning
confidence: 99%