2018
DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2019.1571371
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Chinese infrastructure diplomacy in Russia: the geopolitics of project type, location, and scale

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
9
0
3

Year Published

2019
2019
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6
2

Relationship

1
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 20 publications
(13 citation statements)
references
References 71 publications
0
9
0
3
Order By: Relevance
“…Khabarovsk and Fuyuan are divided by the Amur River, with much exchange between them (Iwashita 2004). With the bridge between Blagoveschensk and Heihe, first mooted in the early 1990s, finally completed in 2019, the two nations have found a variety of ways through which to develop their exchange (Iwashita 2005;Shaglanova 2016;Jia and Bennett 2018). The China-North Korea border, meanwhile, is most familiar from Dandong and Sinuiju on the Yalu River, but exchange also occurs at points like Namyang and Hunchun (Cathcart, Green, and Denney 2020), and along the Russia-North Korea border at Khasan (Golunov 2016).…”
Section: Border Processes In Northeast Asiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Khabarovsk and Fuyuan are divided by the Amur River, with much exchange between them (Iwashita 2004). With the bridge between Blagoveschensk and Heihe, first mooted in the early 1990s, finally completed in 2019, the two nations have found a variety of ways through which to develop their exchange (Iwashita 2005;Shaglanova 2016;Jia and Bennett 2018). The China-North Korea border, meanwhile, is most familiar from Dandong and Sinuiju on the Yalu River, but exchange also occurs at points like Namyang and Hunchun (Cathcart, Green, and Denney 2020), and along the Russia-North Korea border at Khasan (Golunov 2016).…”
Section: Border Processes In Northeast Asiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Det er blitt inngått formelle samarbeidsavtaler mellom Kina og Russland der jernbaneutbygging er blitt spesielt nevnt (Felleserklaering, 2015). Slike prosjekter kan også sees på som et ledd i kinesisk «infrastruktur-diplomati» -statlig engasjement i utbyggingen av en annen stats infrastruktur (Jia & Bennett, 2018). Fra russisk side har det vaert uttrykt store forventninger til kinesiske investeringer i infrastruktur som kan bidra til økonomisk utvikling i nord, men det finnes også russiske observatører som er skeptiske til kinesiske initiativer: Ligger det politiske ambisjoner bak Kinas ønske om sterkere innflytelse i Arktis (Gudev, 2019;Leonov, 2019)?…”
Section: Innledningunclassified
“…Andre kinesiske infrastrukturselskaper har kommet inn siden, men størrelsen på og betingelsene for deres eventuelle rolle er ikke kjent. I et annet stort kinesisk jernbaneprosjekt i Russland -høyhastighetsbanen Kazan-Moskva -ser det ut til at uenighet om fordeling av risiko og kontroll var en av årsakene til at prosjektet stoppet opp (Jia & Bennett, 2018), selv om kostnader var den formelle begrunnelsen på russisk side for å utsette det prosjektet på ubestemt tid (Zubarev, 2020).…”
Section: Hvilke Laerdommer Kan Trekkes?unclassified
“…They believe that the Northern Sea Route has certain advantages over other available Arctic shipping corridors. Fanqi and Bennett [2019] investigate bilateral cooperation in transport and energy infrastructure sectors. They evaluate the impacts of the project type, location, and scale of infrastructure diplomacy on the design, construction, and exploitation of different objects, in Arctic zone, in particular.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%