2020
DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2020.1829464
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China, India and the pattern of G20/BRICS engagement: differentiated ambivalence between ‘rising’ power status and solidarity with the Global South

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Cited by 23 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…Bergamaschi et al, 2017;Cheru, 2011;Fiddian-Qasmiyeh & Daley, 2019;Gray & Gills, 2016;Gürcan, 2019;Kragelund, 2019). In any case, while such de-Westernising institutions as the BRICS New Development Bank are established (Al-Kassimi, 2018;Mignolo, 2021), confrontation joins with contestation within the institutions of global coloniality, where especially the BRICS -individually or collectively -frequently strategically ally with the G-77 (Cooper, 2021;Gürcan, 2019;Hopewell, 2017). Although SSC may indeed have engendered a partial 'fracturing' of the historical North-South hierarchies (Mawdsley, 2020), the North's 'manipulation' of the World Bank voting power adjustment process (see Vestergaard & Wade, 2013), however, is indicative of the limits to such a strategy, and of the Global North's steadfast resistance to any more substantive democratization of the global order, i.e.…”
Section: Ssc For Delinking As De-westernisationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bergamaschi et al, 2017;Cheru, 2011;Fiddian-Qasmiyeh & Daley, 2019;Gray & Gills, 2016;Gürcan, 2019;Kragelund, 2019). In any case, while such de-Westernising institutions as the BRICS New Development Bank are established (Al-Kassimi, 2018;Mignolo, 2021), confrontation joins with contestation within the institutions of global coloniality, where especially the BRICS -individually or collectively -frequently strategically ally with the G-77 (Cooper, 2021;Gürcan, 2019;Hopewell, 2017). Although SSC may indeed have engendered a partial 'fracturing' of the historical North-South hierarchies (Mawdsley, 2020), the North's 'manipulation' of the World Bank voting power adjustment process (see Vestergaard & Wade, 2013), however, is indicative of the limits to such a strategy, and of the Global North's steadfast resistance to any more substantive democratization of the global order, i.e.…”
Section: Ssc For Delinking As De-westernisationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is also overlap and links between the BRICS, the NDB, and the G20 (Larionova and Shelepov, 2019; see Cooper, 2020; Larionova and Shelepov, this issue). The G20 is considered a forum for emerging powers, unlike the G7, which is seen as a western lobby (Larson, 2018).…”
Section: The Brics and The Ndb In The Broader Schema Of International...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On a more theoretical note, global change and the emergence of the BRICS countries can be understood as continuing the decolonization process (Käkönen, 2019b). The cooperation of the BRICS countries can be seen as South-South Cooperation (see Bergamaschi et al, 2017; Cooper, 2021; Mthembu, 2018; Muhr, 2016). As outlined by Käkönen (2019b, p. 415), Global South cooperation “changes continuously” and serves the developing world’s interests in the international system’s decolonization.…”
Section: Literature Review: the Brics Debatementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Sino-Indian relationship is a relationship that, at times, is troubled, for instance, with the continuing border dispute and with the string of pearls and Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean Region (see Brewster, 2018; Cooper, 2021; Scott, 2008, Table 3).…”
Section: Bilateral Trade Relations Of China and The Other Brics Countriesmentioning
confidence: 99%