Children's selective trust: When a group majority is confronted with past accuracy

Abstract

In two experiments, 3-to 5-year-old children were tested for their preferences when seeking and accepting information about novel animals. In Experiment 1, children watched as two adults named unfamiliar animalsone adult was predominantly accurate, whereas the other was predominantly inaccurate, as judged by a teacher. In a subsequent test phase, participants viewed additional unfamiliar animals and were invited to endorse one of two conflicting names. Either the predominantly accurate or the predominantly inaccurate adult proposed one name, whereas a majority of three unfamiliar adults proposed the other name. Children were more likely to endorse the predominantly accurate adult as compared to the majority but showed no significant preference for the predominantly inaccurate adult as compared to the majority. In Experiment 2, participants watched two adults correctly name three familiar animals, but only one named three additional unfamiliar animals whereas the other expressed uncertainty. On subsequent test trials, children preferred the apparently well-informed adult to the lessinformed adult but, contrary to the results of Experiment 1, children preferred the information provided by a majority instead of the apparently well-informed adult. The implications of these results are discussed in the light of previous research on children's selective trust in an accurate informant as compared to a consensus. Statement of contributionWhat is already known on the subject?Young children monitor past accuracy and use this epistemic cue to decide whom to trust; Children are receptive to information coming from a consensus; Non-epistemic cues, such as familiarity and accent, also influence children's deferenceWhat does this study adds? Children favour a dissenter over a majority if the dissenter's past accuracy has been publicly highlighted. They favour a majority if a dissenter's past accuracy has not been publicly highlighted. A confident informant is preferred to a hesitant informant.

Epistemic trust: a comprehensive review of empirical insights and implications for developmental psychopathology

“…It was found that they normally consider past accuracy more important than other epistemic cues. For example, 3- to 6- year-olds were more likely to endorse claims from someone who has proven accurate in the past, even if the claims conflicted with those of the majority (Einav, 2014 ; Sampaio et al , 2019 ; Scofield et al ., 2013 ). However, children do not always treat a previously inaccurate informant as unreliable.…”

Can Children and Adults Balance Majority Size with Information Quality in Learning from Preferences?

“…Others have found evidence showing that children under age six are swayed by the presence of a majority, even when there are other cues to information quality available: for example, 4-year-olds did not consistently endorse an informant with a past history of success over a conflicting majority with unknown expertise (Burdett et al, 2016;Sampaio et al, 2019).…”

The effect of relative accuracy and social characteristic strength on children's selective trust

“…When the reliability of consensus is weakened by other cognitive factors, they will choose dissenter. Sampaio et al (2019) found two people with different accuracy in the familiarization phase (80%vs.20%), compared with the consensus respectively, facing a dissenter with 20% accuracy, 3-5-year-olds trusted a group; facing a dissenter with 80% accuracy, Children trusted a dissenter ;Zhang Jing et al (2020) found that inaccurate group (accuracy 0%) and accurate dissenter (accuracy 100%) , Four-year-old children make trust judgments based on consensus, Children aged 5-6 years old make trust judgment according to the accuracy; Bernard et al (2015) found that only 6 years old children prefer to trust an accurate (100% accurate) dissenter, Children aged 4 and 5 trust inaccurate majority (0% accuracy). In the conflict of consensus and accuracy, which age is the turning point of young children towards accuracy characteristics?…”

“…The accuracy of the classical object naming paradigm considers the rationality of the familiarization phase trials in the selective trust research paradigm (Koenig et al, 2004;Bernard et al, 2015;Sampaio et al, 2019). Corriveau ( 2013) has used four trials to control 100% vs.0% and 75% vs.25% accuracy, Sampaio et al (2019) used 5 trials to manipulate 80% vs. And 20% of the accuracy.…”

“…The accuracy of the classical object naming paradigm considers the rationality of the familiarization phase trials in the selective trust research paradigm (Koenig et al, 2004;Bernard et al, 2015;Sampaio et al, 2019). Corriveau ( 2013) has used four trials to control 100% vs.0% and 75% vs.25% accuracy, Sampaio et al (2019) used 5 trials to manipulate 80% vs. And 20% of the accuracy. Experiment 1 was evaluated as 100% vs.0% was the baseline level, further narrowing the relative difference and using 5 trials to present 60% vs.40% accuracy difference, exploring consensus features conflict with relative accuracy under young children's trust performance.…”