Chieftaincy, Diaspora, and Development: The Institution of Nksuohene in Ghana

Bob-Milliar, George M.

doi:10.1093/afraf/adp045

Cited by 44 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…Chieftaincy is an African indigenous system of governance with executive, judicial, and legislative arms and powers. In Ghana, as in other parts of Africa, chieftaincy institutions are governed by "chiefs" whose symbol of authority is the stool/skin, depending on customary and cultural practices [55]. According to Article 277 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, a "chief" refers to a person, who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected, and enstooled, enskinned, or installed as a chief or queen mother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage [56].…”

Section: The Constitution Chieftaincy and Land Deals In Ghana: Assomentioning

confidence: 99%

Illicit Chinese Small-Scale Mining in Ghana: Beyond Institutional Weakness?

2019

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While the engagement of Chinese migrants in small-scale mining in Ghana has gained traction in scholarship, the extant literature pays little attention to how the relationship between the so-called formal institutions (e.g., the Minerals Commission and Ministry of Land and Natural Resources) and informal institutions (e.g., the chieftaincy and customary land institutions) enables illegalities in the mining industry. This paper addresses this gap in the literature, focusing on the relationship between formal state and informal customary land institutions in the small-scale mining sector. Using an institutional analytical framework, we argue that the increasing involvement of the Chinese in small-scale mining in Ghana is an expression of a bigger and deep-seated problem characterized largely by uncoordinated interactions between key state and customary institutions. This, we suggest, creates parallel operations of formal and informal systems that promote different levels of agency and maneuvering among actors-breeding uncertainty, bureaucratic logjams, and illegalities in the mining industry. Based on our findings, we recommend that a more efficient coordination between the relevant state and traditional land governing institutions could curb the proliferation of illegal mining activities, and in particular, those involving Chinese migrants. As part of the conclusion, we suggest that future empirical research be conducted to explore the interactions between formal and informal institutions and how they affect mining activities.

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Section: The Constitution Chieftaincy and Land Deals In Ghana: Assomentioning

confidence: 99%

Illicit Chinese Small-Scale Mining in Ghana: Beyond Institutional Weakness?

2019

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“…2 Likewise, Nkrumah was preoccupied with the notion of an African personality to be restored through Afrocentric art and research (Botwe-Asamoah 2005). At independence he called for assistance in the development of Ghana as the first '"Black" nation south of the Sahara to break the colonial chains' (Gaines 2006, also see Essien 2008, Bob-Milliar 2009:1, Pierre 2013. Likewise, when Nkrumah visited the US in 1958, he ensured AfricanAmericans a warm welcome in Ghana, invoking the 'bonds of blood and kinship' that link them to Ghana (Botwe-Asamoah 2005:130, Gaines 2006.…”

Section: Political Liberation and Solidarity: Pan-africanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Flexible Politics of Belonging: Diaspora Mobilisation in Ghana

Kleist

2013

African Studies

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“…In the Ghanaian traditional system, it is believed that the indigenous chiefs do, in fact, represent the people on the basis that there is considerable deference to the chieftaincy institutions (Bob-Milliar, 2009;Kleist, 2011). However, there is some evidence that, with respect to the land question, chiefs have recurrently abused trust reposed in them (Austin, 2005;Ubink, 2007Ubink, , 2008.…”

Section: Compensationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Windfalls, wipeouts, and local economic development: A study of an emerging oil city in West Africa

Obeng‐Odoom

2013

Local Economy

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Analysis of the political economy of oil tends to be under the rubric of 'resource curse' to the neglect of the broader problematique of the distribution of windfalls and wipeouts, the mediating role of institutions, and broader issues of local economic development. This article tries to fill this lacuna by focusing on the experiences of Sekondi-Takoradi, an oil city located in Ghana. Using the principles of eminent domain and decentralisation as analytical framework, it shows 'who gets what' in an oil city; demonstrates why different levels of compensation and betterment ought to be paid and received; and reveals the role and struggles of the local State in trying to ensure harmonious local economic development.

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Chieftaincy, Diaspora, and Development: The Institution of Nksuohene in Ghana

Cited by 44 publications

References 56 publications

Illicit Chinese Small-Scale Mining in Ghana: Beyond Institutional Weakness?

Illicit Chinese Small-Scale Mining in Ghana: Beyond Institutional Weakness?

Flexible Politics of Belonging: Diaspora Mobilisation in Ghana

Windfalls, wipeouts, and local economic development: A study of an emerging oil city in West Africa

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