Chiefs, NGOs and alternative conflict resolution mechanisms in post-conflict Sierra Leone

Abstract

The nature of chieftaincy has been identified as one of the causes of Sierra Leone's civil conflict, but the institution has largely retained its pre-war privileges and conflict triggers. Using evidence from ethnographic research, this piece investigates the tensions between chiefs and NGOs in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Chiefs perceive NGOs as undercutting their powers and livelihood, resulting in strains. Given the entrenched nature of chieftaincy, current attempts by NGOs to ensure better judicial outcomes for the poor will produce limited success, if the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust persists. A trustful and congenial relationship between chiefs and NGOs is proposed.

Politics, development and the instrumentalisation of (de)centralisation in Sierra Leone

“…The results and follow-on actions emanating from nationwide consultations on the design of decentralization in that year, point to the ritualistic nature of consultation, and the persistent determination of the political class to subvert citizens' preferences in furtherance of its own goals. In particular, whereas the consultations revealed a preference for non-partisan local council elections (Fanthorpe 2005;Conteh 2014a) given the public's mistrust of career politicians, Fanthorpe (2005) has argued that "…The SLPP-led government rejected this demand, claiming, somewhat unconvincingly given its overwhelming parliamentary majority, that opposition parties had forced its hand". This assertion by the SLPP, contradicts the reality of proceedings in Sierra Leone's parliament.…”

“…The almost even distribution of the number of local councils controlled by the APC and SLPP has ensured that decentralized resources are horizontally spread across the 19 local councils, given the relatively transparent intergovernmental transfer formula established by the Local Government Finance Department in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (Kargbo 2009). However, there have been claims by opposition controlled councils of unfair treatment by the central government, over extra support outside the statutory intergovernmental transfers (Conteh 2014a); as well as suspicions that the government would like to see opposition councils fail, by not strengthening and empowering them (Fanthorpe et al 2011). A frequently cited example is the amount of kilometres of roads allocated to the northern city of Makeni and other district head quarter towns in the north, under the central government's roads construction and rehabilitation programme, compared with those in the south and east of the country.…”

“…Thus, although political allegiance is important in getting access to power through local elections which are relatively less contested than national elections (Conteh 2014a), group solidarity within the political class becomes the prerequisite for success and continued accommodation. Sannoh's dealings with the government, can be contrasted with the treatment of the APC Mayor of Koidu City, Saa Emerson Lamina, who was suspended on allegations of financial impropriety in early 2016 by the Minister of Local Government and Rural Development (Awareness Times, March 2, 2016).…”

“…This scenario indicates that certain political processes normally put in place by political parties to encourage popular participation, are basically symbolic and used by powerful politicians to create a semblance of inclusivity and empowerment. Although in the 2008 and 2012 local council elections some parties embarked on a symbolic participatory process in conducting primary elections for candidates at the ward level, the final decisions were made in Freetown (Conteh, 2014a). In what was not a rare instance in , Overbeek (2008 has noted that one aspirant was reported to have paid the equivalent of US $ 700 in a bid to obtain a party symbol.…”

The promise and reality of decentralization: a critical appraisal of Sierra Leone’s primary health care system

“…In addition to the strained relationship between local councils and DHMTs, their individual attempts to regulate and coordinate the operations of NGOs, have been largely unsuccessful. Decades of systemic neglect and the civil war of the 1990s left the country's service delivery infrastructure severely weakened; and the state's abdication of responsibility for the provision of certain services in the interior of the country was accompanied by the growth and expansion of the NGO industry, which filled the resulting gap (Conteh 2014b;Nishimuko 2009;Zack-Williams 1999). By the end of the War, NGOs became entrenched and wielded immense influence in the provision of services for communities.…”