Politics, development and the instrumentalisation of (de)centralisation in Sierra Leone

Abstract

The politics of decentralization reforms in Sierra Leone are both unpredictable and instructive. This article based on fieldwork and secondary data, analyses party politics within the context of decentralization, arguing that the imperatives of postwar decentralization are not necessarily embedded in technical considerations, but in processes of political compromise and accommodation. Decentralization has helped facilitate the re-emergence of the old political order, in that the country's main political parties have secured a consensus through which they have reconfigured the postwar state. This framing is useful in understanding the political economy in which fragility and political compromise continue to co-exist.

Artisanal mining policy reforms, informality and challenges to the Sustainable Development Goals in Sierra Leone

“…However, the Chief's claim is not without some merit. Other studies have reported similar findings on how members of the political class who fall out of favour with their peers can be excluded and punished in overt and sometimes subtle ways (Conteh 2017;Conteh and Maconachie, 2019). In addition to delays in the processing of artisanal mining licences and the influence politics play in such processes, what takes place at the NMA is reliant on the number of licence applications it receives from the chiefdoms, where the process of applying for an artisanal mining licence actually starts.…”

“…However, little effort was made to do away with the bifurcated artisanal mining licencing regime, within which the NMA and Chieftaincy structures play mutually beneficial roles. The failure of the authorities to harmonise this decades' old arrangement is not unconnected to long running processes of political bargaining and accommodation involving national politicians and Chiefs on the one hand (Tangri 1978;1980;Conteh 2017), and the country's land tenure system on the other hand.…”

Government–donor relations in Sierra Leone: who is in the driving seat?

“…As already noted, there are also cases of mock compliance, such as the hurried passage of the Access to Information Law in October 2013 – which had been in the making for almost a decade – in an apparent bid to influence the decision of the Millennium Challenge Corporation in that year (Domestic NGO head 12.7.2016 Int. ); and the politically instrumental purposes served by the donor-supported decentralisation programme (Conteh 2017). Agency in government needs emphasis, as the availability of donor funds fosters a sense of moral hazard and allows the government to channel resources to other uses such as infrastructural projects and public and political goods, and from which officials can obtain personalised transactional gains (Conteh 2016).…”

Spaces for contestation: The politics of community development agreements in Sierra Leone

“…For the most part, PHC identification meetings have been rubber-stamping forums, in which prepared lists of PHCs are approved by participants and endorsed by the NMA, with outcomes only ever being challenged after the meetings have concluded. This is not surprising given that participants are mostly elite actorschiefs, members of parliament (MPs), local council officials and other co-opted individuals, whose interests often converge, given the homogeneity and less conflictual basis of their interests (Conteh, 2017). The fact that local councils, which by law should jointly decide the PHC with companies, would concede to the active participation of other members of the political class, while excluding ordinary community members, is indicative of elite solidarity, regardless of existing legal constraints.…”

“…Although in this case the participation of the local council is supported by law, and a means through which a compromise has been reached between the two rival chiefdoms, its involvement, however, illustrates the risks involved in the law granting local councils and the companies exclusive right to determine the PHCs. Such risks are often accentuated by the lack of effective accountability mechanisms to prevent resource capture, given the strong group solidarity existing among the elite (Conteh, 2017). First, by sanctioning only the local councils and mining companies to decide what constitutes the PHC, the law takes away the rights "…of the affected communities to participate in the decisions that would have an impact on their livelihood" (Nwapi, 2017: 208).…”