Chapter 7 Experiments on Clientelism and Vote-Buying

Gallego, Jorge; Wantchekon, Leonardo

doi:10.1108/s0193-2306(2012)0000015009

Cited by 31 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Another way to demonstrate that social network ties matter because of information and monitoring is to exploit differences in the perception of vote secrecy to compare the sample in cases that vary in terms of the need for monitoring. Monitoring is an important feature of vote buying in the context of a secret ballot and is extensively covered in the literature (see, e.g., Gallego & Wantchekon, 2012; Nichter, 2008; Rueda, 2017). Studies of differences in vote secrecy across jurisdictions also point to the link between monitoring and ballot secrecy.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Networks and the Targeting of Vote Buying

Cruz

2018

Comparative Political Studies

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The social networks of voters have been shown to facilitate political cooperation and information transmission in established democracies. These same social networks, however, can also make it easier for politicians in new democracies to engage in clientelistic electoral strategies. Using survey data from the Philippines, this article demonstrates that individuals with more friend and family ties are disproportionately targeted for vote buying. This is consistent with the importance of other social factors identified in the literature such as reciprocity, direct ties to politicians, and individual social influence. In addition, this article presents evidence supporting an additional mechanism linking voter social networks to the targeting of vote buying: social network–based monitoring. Voters with larger networks are both more sensitive to the ramifications of reneging on vote buying agreements and are primarily targeted for vote buying in contexts where monitoring is necessary.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Networks and the Targeting of Vote Buying

Cruz

2018

Comparative Political Studies

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“…Looking at the analysis of Gonzalez-Ocantos et al (2012) more closely, the limitation of their approach is that dividing the sample into several sub-groups significantly reduces the number of observations in each sub-group, leading to large standard errors that distort the inferential analysis (Gallego and Wantchekon 2012). Therefore, almost all of the sub-group comparisons they investigate result either in a null finding (e.g., partisanship, income) or in a statistically weak result that contradicts conventional wisdom (e.g., education).…”

Section: [Figure 1 About Here]mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 1 This is because the probability of misrepresentation of true behavior might not be orthogonal to important covariates such as income, education, or partisanship (Gallego and Wantchekon, 2012). …”

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confidence: 99%

Who gets targeted for vote-buying? Evidence from an augmented list experiment in Turkey

Çarkoğlu

Aytaç

2014

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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Understanding the dynamics of vote-buying is essential to improve accountability of elections in developing democracies. While list experiments are useful for attenuating social desirability bias associated with measuring vote-buying, they are not conducive to multivariate analyses, and the question of what types of individuals are targeted is left inadequately explored. We overcome this limitation by combining a population-based list experiment with an estimator (LISTIT) that allows for multivariate analyses in an efficient manner. Our analysis suggests that in the 2011 parliamentary elections of Turkey over one-third of the electorate was targeted for vote-buying, which is more than double the proportion willing to admit when asked directly. Additionally, we find that strong partisans of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), less-educated individuals, and urban residents are significantly more likely to be targeted for vote-buying. We present compelling evidence for the hypotheses that parties target their core supporters and socio-economically vulnerable individuals. The strength of our evidence derives from the use of original data on vote-buying that has been collected in an unobtrusive manner and analyzed at the level of individuals. WORD COUNT: 86671 This is because the probability of misrepresentation of true behavior might not be orthogonal to important covariates such as income, education, or partisanship (Gallego and Wantchekon 2012).

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“…As noted above, vote buying is illegal in most countries, including Indonesia, and usually linked to a negative social stigma (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al, 2012;Hicken, 2007). Therefore, some scholars have expressed suspicions that respondents directly asked about such practices are unlikely to report accurate information due to the problem of social desirability (Gallego and Wantchekon, 2012;Corstange, 2012). In order to address this concern, survey-based experiments are suitable instruments to evaluate the credibility of individual survey items and consolidate their overall validity.…”

Section: Little Social Desirability Biasmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Prevalence of Vote Buying in Indonesia: Building an Index

Muhtadi

2019

Vote Buying in Indonesia

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Chapter 7 Experiments on Clientelism and Vote-Buying

Cited by 31 publications

References 21 publications

Social Networks and the Targeting of Vote Buying

Social Networks and the Targeting of Vote Buying

Who gets targeted for vote-buying? Evidence from an augmented list experiment in Turkey

The Prevalence of Vote Buying in Indonesia: Building an Index

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