Who gets targeted for vote-buying? Evidence from an augmented list experiment in Turkey

Abstract

Understanding the dynamics of vote-buying is essential to improve accountability of elections in developing democracies. While list experiments are useful for attenuating social desirability bias associated with measuring vote-buying, they are not conducive to multivariate analyses, and the question of what types of individuals are targeted is left inadequately explored. We overcome this limitation by combining a population-based list experiment with an estimator (LISTIT) that allows for multivariate analyses in an efficient manner. Our analysis suggests that in the 2011 parliamentary elections of Turkey over one-third of the electorate was targeted for vote-buying, which is more than double the proportion willing to admit when asked directly. Additionally, we find that strong partisans of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), less-educated individuals, and urban residents are significantly more likely to be targeted for vote-buying. We present compelling evidence for the hypotheses that parties target their core supporters and socio-economically vulnerable individuals. The strength of our evidence derives from the use of original data on vote-buying that has been collected in an unobtrusive manner and analyzed at the level of individuals. WORD COUNT: 86671 This is because the probability of misrepresentation of true behavior might not be orthogonal to important covariates such as income, education, or partisanship (Gallego and Wantchekon 2012).

Asking sensitive questions using the unmatched count technique: Applications and guidelines for conservation

“…Larger sample sizes were often achieved by embedding UCT questions within existing nationwide surveys (e.g. Çarkoğlu & Aytaç, ) or using professional survey companies (e.g. Kiewiet De Jonge, ).…”

Remittances and Vote Buying

“…direction across models, there is no strong evidence that vote buying is preferentially targeted at lower income groups, a common assumption in theories of clientelism. However, this finding is not an isolated one in the literature (Corstange 2012;Çarkoğlu and Aytaç 2015;González-Ocantos et al 2012; González-Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge, and Nickerson 2015; Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015; Schaffer and Baker 2015). 13 As we argued earlier, with a downward shift in turnout propensity parties could choose to target remittance recipients in order to buy participation.…”

The Determinants of Vote Buying: The Profile of Typical Vote ‘Sellers’

“…Scholars have long suggested that those with lower levels of education will more likely be engaged in quid pro quo exchanges before and during elections (e.g. Kitschelt, 2000;Brusco et al, 2004;Çarkoglu and Aytac, 2015). Equally, it has been claimed that respondents with more education will be less vulnerable to such practices since "as education increases, the life prospects for individuals also increase through better employment and higher incomes" (Sugiyama and Hunter, 2013: 51).…”