Channeling the “Restless Spirit of Innovation”: Elite Concessions and Institutional Change in the British Reform Act of 1832

Abstract

IntroductIonW hat is the nature of the relationship between mass mobilization and democratic change? the question has grown in importance as the elitist leanings of recent decades have yielded to a renewed emphasis on popular contributions to democratization. 1 if it remains the case that "regime changes occur when elites give in, one way or another," 2 then it is increasingly recognized that we need to pursue more fully the sources of elite vulnerability. this has generally been understood in terms of pressure from below: elites will make democratic concessions when faced with substantial, even revolutionary, popular challenges to power and privilege. 3 But do we fully understand how, and how well, this causal relationship works?Britain stands as the ideal type of democratization by elite concession. Within this broader case, the first Reform act of 1832 represents the best case for the thesis that elites yielded democratic gains as a response to the threat of revolution. 4 faced with significant social un-* the author wishes to thank frieda fuchs, samuel Clark, Robert Young, Richard vernon, laura stephenson, Jennifer Mori, Joanna innes, neville thompson and the British history seminar of the University of Western ontario, Carol nackenoff and the Research Colloquium of the swarthmore College Department of political science, the anonymous reviewers of World politics, and especially peter hall for providing critical feedback and helpful advice on this article, as well as anton spadar for diligent research assistance.1 Rueschemeyer, stephens, and stephens 1992; . in the second and third Reform acts, enhanced popular activity emerged in response to elite initiation (Biagini 1992) and perhaps also as a "delayed response" to much earlier Chartist agitation (Rueschemeyer, stephens, and stephens 1992, 96).

Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence From the Great Reform Act of 1832

“…The first alternative explanation for the Whig victory in 1831 is that administrative reforms in the pre-reform years weakened the Tories' ability to control seats (Morrison (2011)). While it is true that Lord Liverpool undertook reforms after 1815 to make the administration more efficient and less corrupt (see, e.g., Jupp (1998, Chapter 1), Mokyr (2009, pp.…”

“…46-56), Philbin (1965)). A simple test of Morrison's (2011) conjecture is to assume that the Tories lost hold of the 14 English constituencies (28 seats) which were controlled by the Treasury in 1830 and then to re-estimate equation (1) on the reduced sample that excludes these constituencies. If the conjecture is true and we confound the effect of the administrative reforms with that of the Swing riots, the coefficient on Riots within 10 km should become insignificant.…”

How Did Britain Democratize? Views from the Sovereign Bond Market

“…Challenging this account are those who highlight the presence of major social unrest and constitutional crisis in nineteenth-century Britain, asserting that the old regime elites reluctantly conceded suffrage reform only in the face of intense social and political instability (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Morrison 2011; Aidt and Franck 2013). 7 Proponents of this view point to the steady stream of public demonstrations and strikes and other forms of extra-parliamentary pressure that led to each of Britain's major democratic reforms.…”

“…One long-standing view, rooted in a classical “Whig” interpretation of history (see critique by Butterfield 1965), is that Britain was distinctive in requiring little social and political conflict in the modern era to democratize. Others argue that, whether driven by destabilizing constitutional crises or even the threat of mass revolution (Therborn 1977; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Morrison 2011; Aidt and Franck 2013), the process of democratization in Britain was deeply conflict-ridden even into the nineteenth century.…”