“…According to Jeuland and Shugan (1983), channel coordination was defined as the 6 setting of all manufacturer and retailer-related decisions at the levels that would maximise total channel profits. The literature on supply chain coordination is rich including the studies on coordinating manufacturing supply chains (Jeuland and Shugan 1983;Ingene and Parry 1995;Weng 1995;Iyer 1998;Tsay Agrawal 2004;Raju and Zhang 2005;Cai 2010) and the supply chain scenarios where service is considered (Ernst and Cohen 1992;Tsay and Arrawal 2000;Boyaci and Gallego 2004;Li et al 2011;Chen and Shen 2012;and Liu et al 2013). …”
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confidence: 99%
“…The research finding showed that a channel in which one 8 manufacturer chose to be coordinated while the other chose to be non-coordinated can be equilibrium in markets with weak brand loyalty. Cai (2010) investigated the influence of four supply chain structures with and without coordination on the supplier and the retailer. Their finding suggested that the channel selection and coordination preferences depend on parameters like channel base demand, channel, operational cost, and channel substitutability.…”
General rightsThis document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms Abstracts: This paper examines the feasibility of employing subsidy contracts as a control mechanism to optimise the mobile phone sales channel. We investigate a dual-channel that consists of a telecommunication service operator (TSO) and a mobile phone manufacturer (MPM). The MPM's optimal production quantity and optimal retail price and the TSO's optimal service capacity and optimal service price are derived in both the decentralised and centralised MPSC models. The modelling results show that the coordinated MPSC leads to profit increase for the MPSC as a whole. More importantly, our analysis demonstrates that a properly designed subsidy contract can achieve the channel coordination in the MPSC.However, such channel coordination through subsidy contract is subject to certain conditions in which Pareto improvement can be achieved.
“…According to Jeuland and Shugan (1983), channel coordination was defined as the 6 setting of all manufacturer and retailer-related decisions at the levels that would maximise total channel profits. The literature on supply chain coordination is rich including the studies on coordinating manufacturing supply chains (Jeuland and Shugan 1983;Ingene and Parry 1995;Weng 1995;Iyer 1998;Tsay Agrawal 2004;Raju and Zhang 2005;Cai 2010) and the supply chain scenarios where service is considered (Ernst and Cohen 1992;Tsay and Arrawal 2000;Boyaci and Gallego 2004;Li et al 2011;Chen and Shen 2012;and Liu et al 2013). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The research finding showed that a channel in which one 8 manufacturer chose to be coordinated while the other chose to be non-coordinated can be equilibrium in markets with weak brand loyalty. Cai (2010) investigated the influence of four supply chain structures with and without coordination on the supplier and the retailer. Their finding suggested that the channel selection and coordination preferences depend on parameters like channel base demand, channel, operational cost, and channel substitutability.…”
General rightsThis document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms Abstracts: This paper examines the feasibility of employing subsidy contracts as a control mechanism to optimise the mobile phone sales channel. We investigate a dual-channel that consists of a telecommunication service operator (TSO) and a mobile phone manufacturer (MPM). The MPM's optimal production quantity and optimal retail price and the TSO's optimal service capacity and optimal service price are derived in both the decentralised and centralised MPSC models. The modelling results show that the coordinated MPSC leads to profit increase for the MPSC as a whole. More importantly, our analysis demonstrates that a properly designed subsidy contract can achieve the channel coordination in the MPSC.However, such channel coordination through subsidy contract is subject to certain conditions in which Pareto improvement can be achieved.
“…Supply chain coordination happens through horizontal coordination between the same levels of stakeholders and/or vertical coordination between different levels of stakeholders. The typical approaches for horizontal coordination include revenue sharing through centralized warehousing (Eppen, 1979), market segmentation (Munson et al, 2003;Munson et al, 2013), and alliance and partnership (Cetiner and Kimms, 2013); and for vertical coordination include channel integration (Yan, 2011), new channel creation (Cai, 2010), and so on.…”
Section: Theoretical Foundations and Literature Reviewmentioning
Coordinating stakeholder's actions in a supply chain provides an efficient approach to enhance supply chain performance and win today's fierce competition in the market. Using quantitative examples is proved to be an efficient pedagogical methodology to motivate students learning and facilitate students' in-depth knowledge in supply chain management education. This study provides six quantitative supply chain horizontal and vertical coordination examples, which aim to increase the profit of the whole supply chain. Each example describes the supply chain coordination model with the background of certain supply chain features. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are provided to illustrate the benefits of supply chain coordination visually. These examples serve as supplements of an introductory operations management/supply chain management course when the supply chain management fundamentals are taught. They offer a unique viewpoint and roadmap for instructors teaching operations management / supply chain management related courses.
“…Due to the popularity of the dual-channel structure, many studies investigate whether a manufacturer should open up a direct channel (Park and Keh [3], Chiang et al [4], Liu and Zhang [5], Dumrongsiri et al [6], Cai [7], and Yoo and Lee [8]). However, in the situation with cost uncertainty, the analysis of channel choice is still lacking.…”
Many studies examine information sharing in an uncertain demand environment in a supply chain. However there is little literature on cost information sharing in a dual-channel structure consisting of a retail channel and a direct sales channel. Assuming that the retail sale cost and direct sale cost are random variables with a general distribution, the paper investigates the retailer's choice on cost information sharing in a Bertrand competition model. Based on the equilibrium outcome of information sharing, the manufacturer's channel choice is discussed in detail. Our paper provides several interesting conclusions. In both single-and dualchannel structures, the retailer has little motivation to share its private cost information which is verified to be valuable for the manufacturer. When the cost correlation between the two channels increases, our analyses show that the manufacturer's profit improves. However, when channel choice is involved, the value of information could play a different role. The paper finds that a dual-channel structure can benefit the manufacturer only when the cost correlation is sufficiently low. In addition, if the cost correlation is weak, the cost fluctuation will bring out the advantage of a dual-channel structure and adding a new direct channel will help in risk pooling.
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