Challenging Authority

Hurd, Heidi M.

doi:10.2307/796782

Cited by 114 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…b (i.e., when the value to voters of an incumbent who makes a correct prediction exceeds the value of an optimistic incumbent), there is some point where p is sufficiently high such that the incumbent prefers to set a low expectation. Most obviously, this is the case when the leader has practical authority over the domain (see Christiano [2012] and Hurd [1991] for the distinction between practical and theoretical authority). We summarize the theoretical framework in Figure 2(d), where we plot U(H) 2 U(L) when p 5 1 against a.…”

Section: Theoretical Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Expectation Setting and Retrospective Voting

Malhotra¹,

Margalit²

2014

The Journal of Politics

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That citizens engage in retrospective voting is widely established in the literature. But to what extent is retrospection affected by the expectations that leaders set in advance? We develop a theoretical framework of how expectation setting affects voters' retrospective evaluations of incumbent performance. To test the theory, we conduct a series of between-subjects experiments in which we independently manipulate both expectation setting and the eventual outcome. In domains where politicians have practical authority, or direct influence over outcomes, setting high expectations incurs a cost in public support if the projected outcome is not attained. The same is true in domains where politicians have theoretical authority, or limited influence, but where expectation setting sends a signal about the leader's judgment. However, in domains where politicians have neither practical nor theoretical authority, setting high expectations is unambiguously beneficial, implying that optimism is valued by voters as a personality disposition.

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Section: Theoretical Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Expectation Setting and Retrospective Voting

Malhotra¹,

Margalit²

2014

The Journal of Politics

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“…As we shall argue below, the most that well-known mini-maxims can be are particularly helpful sources of theoretical authority. For extended discussions of the authority that rules can possesses, see Hurd (1991Hurd ( , 1999. For lengthy defenses of the thesis that negligence cannot be translated into deontological ''mini-maxims,'' see Hurd (1994Hurd ( , pp.…”

Section: Substituting the Knowing Violation Of A Known Rule For The Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence

Moore

Hurd

2011

Criminal Law, Philosophy

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Negligence is a problematic basis for being morally blamed and punished for having caused some harm, because in such cases there is no choice to cause or allow-or risk causing or allowing-such harm to occur. The standard theories as to why inadvertent risk creation can be blameworthy despite the lack of culpable choice are that in such cases there is blame for: (1) an unexercised capacity to have adverted to the risk; (2) a defect in character explaining why one did not advert to the risk; (3) culpably acquiring or failing to rid oneself of these defects of character at some earlier time; (4) flawed use of those practical reasoning capacities that make one the person one is; or (5) chosen violation of per se rules about known precautions. Although each of these five theories can justify blame in some cases of negligence, none can justify blame in all cases intuitively thought to be cases of negligence, nor can any of these five theories show why inadvertent creation of an unreasonable risk, pure and simple, can be blameworthy.

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“…Consideramos un estándar básico de la razón práctica actuar de acuerdo con el mejor balance de las razones disponibles y, sin embargo, un gobierno tiene autoridad si puede ordenarnos a hacer cosas que se contradigan con dicho balance. En consecuencia, la obediencia cívica violaría un principio central de la racionalidad (Hurd, H.,1991).…”

Section: Autoridad: Teórica Prácticaunclassified

“…Así, no hay obligaciones jurídicas distintas de las obligaciones impuestas por la moral y el derecho solo puede obligar en virtud de funcionar como una guía epistémica hacia ellas. El derecho es, en este sentido, no solo necesariamente conectado con la moral sino completamente dependiente de ésta (Hurd, H., 1991).…”

Section: Conclusionesunclassified

La idea de una autoridad democrática

Aguirre

2016

Rev. Fac. Derecho

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Challenging Authority

Cited by 114 publications

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Expectation Setting and Retrospective Voting

Expectation Setting and Retrospective Voting

Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence

La idea de una autoridad democrática

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