Challenges and Opportunities in Analog and Mixed Signal (AMS) Integrated Circuit (IC) Security

Abstract

In the last decade and so, a large amount of research has been done to secure hardware. Security features such as physically unclonable function (PUF), hardware metering, and obfuscation have been developed to protect hardware from threats. Detection and avoidance techniques for IC counterfeiting and hardware Trojan have been introduced to protect the IC supply chain. Till now, research has focused on digital ICs, but analog and mixed signal (AMS) ICs which hold the highest share in the market have been neglected. The solutions developed in digital domain for digital ICs do not extend well to AMS ICs. Thus, a major portion of the IC market remains unsecured. In this paper, we described the challenges and limitations associated with AMS IC security research focusing on three major sections: AMS-enabled security, counterfeiting, and AMS hardware Trojans. We also express a vision for AMS security research.

Hardware Trojans in Chips: A Survey for Detection and Prevention

“…It has analog and digital components, the radio-frequency integrated circuit (RF IC) belongs to the category of the AMS circuit. The combination of the trigger and the payload in the AMS circuit can be more diversified, which can be an analog trigger plus a digital payload or an analog trigger and an analog payload [ 47 ]. Oscillators, filters, bias generators, and opamps are the targets of HTs.…”

“…What is more, the HT detection methods were emphasized, and the prevention technologies have not been discussed in a framework. Alam et al [ 47 ] included the HTs for the analog circuit in the review, and compared to the digital circuit HT, it further expanded the discussion of HT in the IC category. If this paper can increase the HT research discussion about emerging chips, the review will be more complete.…”

Recycled SoC Detection Using LDO Degradation

“…Several methods have been described in the literature to detect and prevent counterfeit electronics. These methods can be broadly divided into three major categories: (1) Hardware security primitives: This is mostly applicable to new chip designs, where additional security primitives are designed along with existing chip architecture to detect cloned or recycled counterfeits. For cloned counterfeit detection, silicon fingerprints called physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are developed [15].…”

MixLock: Securing Mixed-Signal Circuits via Logic Locking

“…While extensive research efforts have been expended over the last decade in understanding trust and security threat scenarios in digital ICs and developing solutions [1]- [5], the topic remains largely unexplored for analog ICs and there is an alarming lack of understanding of the solution space [6]- [8]. Analog ICs are perhaps the weakest link in warranting the global security policy for the entire electronic system.…”