CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada

Zhou, Xianming

doi:10.1111/0008-4085.00013

Cited by 196 publications

(143 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Our 0.284 estimate (Table 7) is well within the range of estimates reported: 0.22 for UK and 0.41 for U.S. firms (Conyon and Murphy's 2000); 0.37 for the top 1,000 U.S. corporations (Gabaix and Landier 2008); 0.32 for U.S. banks (Barro and Barro's 1990); 0.25 for Canadian publicly traded firms (Zhou 2000); and 0.25 for small U.S. firms (total assets up to 150 million 1993 U.S. dollars) in Cyert et al (2002). This range is fairly narrow, considering differences in samples with respect to time, country, and industry, but our result fits neatly within it.…”

Section: Our Results and Other Studiessupporting

confidence: 82%

Management Economics in a Large Retail Company

Siebert

Zubanov

2010

Management Science

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W e use unique data from 245 stores of a UK retailer to study links among middle (store) manager skills, sales, and manager pay. We find that, of the six management practice areas surveyed, the most important is "commercial awareness," where abler managers achieve up to 13.9% higher sales per worker. We find that many stores have poor managers on this indicator. However, the company is careful to incentivize managers, operating a scheme giving shares (approximately 20%) in both positive and negative deviations of actual sales from expected. Abler managers do not receive higher pay, implying that their skills are company specific.

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Section: Our Results and Other Studiessupporting

confidence: 82%

Management Economics in a Large Retail Company

Siebert

Zubanov

2010

Management Science

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“…Many studies rely on surveys of compensation consultants, such as Tower Perrin's Worldwide Total Remuneration Reports, to reach this conclusion (Abowd and Boggano, 1995;Abowd and Kaplan, 1999;Murphy, 1999;Thomas, 2009). Using actual corporate disclosures, Zhou (2000) con…rms that in , Canadian CEOs received less than half the pay of U.S. CEOs, a smaller fraction of pay in equity, and had lower wealth-performance sensitivities. Using Japanese tax records from 2004, Nakazato, Ramseyer, andRasmusen (2011) show that, controlling for …rm size, Japanese executives earned only 20% of the pay of their U.S. counterparts.…”

Section: International Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans¹,

Gabaix²,

Jenter³

2017

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public firms to private and non-U.S. firms. We then critically analyze three non-exclusive explanations for what drives executive pay -shareholder value maximization by boards, rent extraction by executives, and institutional factors such as regulation, taxation, and accounting policy. We confront each hypothesis with the evidence. While shareholder value maximization is consistent with many practices that initially seem inefficient, no single explanation can account for all facts and historical trends; we highlight major gaps for future research. We discuss evidence on the effects of executive pay, highlighting recent identification strategies, and suggest policy implications grounded in theoretical and empirical research. Our survey has two main goals. First, we aim to tightly link the theoretical literature to the empirical evidence, and combine the insights contributed by all three views on the drivers of pay. Second, we aim to provide a user-friendly guide to executive compensation, presenting shareholder value theories using a simple unifying model, and discussing the challenges and methodological issues with empirical research. JEL-Codes: D310, D860, G340, M120. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…Several previous papers have indicated that a firm's total assets (TA) can be taken as a proxy for firm size (Berger and Ofek, 1995;Zhou, 2003;Zimmerman, 1983). Therefore, this paper uses two proxies, namely stock index returns for firm performance, and trade market value of total assets (TA) for firm size (see Section 3 for further details) to explore the size effects on volatility spillovers between exchange rates and tourism firm performance.…”

Section: Proxy Variables For Firm Size and Firm Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Is small beautiful? Size effects of volatility spillovers for firm performance and exchange rates in tourism

Chang

Hsu

McAleer

2013

The North American Journal of Economics and Finance

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This paper examines the size effects of volatility spillovers for firm performance and exchange rates with asymmetry in the Taiwan tourism industry. The analysis is based on two conditional multivariate models, BEKK-AGARCH and VARMA-AGARCH, in the volatility specification. Daily data from 1 July 2008 to 29 June 2012 for 999 firms are used, which covers the Global Financial Crisis. The empirical findings indicate that there are size effects on volatility spillovers from the exchange rate to firm performance. Specifically, the risk for firm size has different effects from the three leading tourism sources to Taiwan, namely USA, Japan, and China. Furthermore, all the return series reveal quite high volatility spillovers (at over sixty percent) with a one-period lag. The empirical results show a negative correlation between exchange rate returns and stock returns. However, the asymmetric effect of the shock is ambiguous, owing to conflicts in the significance and signs of the asymmetry effect in the two estimated multivariate GARCH models. The empirical findings provide financial managers with a better understanding of how firm size is related to financial performance, risk and portfolio management strategies that can be used in practice.

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CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada

Cited by 196 publications

References 20 publications

Management Economics in a Large Retail Company

Management Economics in a Large Retail Company

Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Is small beautiful? Size effects of volatility spillovers for firm performance and exchange rates in tourism

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