CEO Compensation and Earnings Management: Does Gender Really Matters?

Harris, Oneil; Karl, J. Bradley; Lawrence, Ericka R.

doi:10.5465/ambpp.2017.17786abstract

Cited by 21 publications

(41 citation statements)

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“…Cohen et al, 2008;A. Cohen & Zarowin, 2010;Farooqi et al, 2014;Ge & Kim, 2014;Graham et al, 2005;Harris, Karl, and Lawrence, 2019;Roychowdhury, 2006;Zang, 2012). As in earlier studies, we use abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses to gauge real earnings management activities.…”

Section: Earnings Management Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The variable BSIZE is the natural logarithm of the total number of directors to control for board size, while BINDEP denotes the fraction of independent directors to account for board independence. Studies show that the top manager's degree of corporate power, level of equitybased pay, and gender also affect earnings management behavior (see Chen, Lee, and Chou, 2015;Davidson et al, 2004;Harris, Karl, and Lawrence, 2019;Hsu et al, 2020). Therefore, we include DUAL to control for CEO duality (a lack of separation of CEO and board chair positions), EIN to control for CEO equity incentives (vega-delta ratio) (Appendix 2 explains the calculation of CEO vega and CEO delta in details), and FEMALE to control for the CEO's gender.…”

Section: Regression Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Co-opted boards and earnings management: Evidence of reduced short-termist behavior

Harris

Erkan

2021

BRQ Business Research Quarterly

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This study contributes to the emerging literature on board co-option by examining how and to what extent co-opted directors influence managers’ attitudes about earnings management. We find robust evidence that co-option mitigates both real activities and accrual-based earnings management. Our findings support the view that higher co-option reduces managerial short-termism because it enhances managers’ job security as co-opted directors are known to be less likely to remove managers from office. Our results are robust to different measures of both co-option and earnings management, and they continue to hold after accounting for endogeneity and selection concerns. Finally, we provide additional evidence showing that a higher degree of co-option lowers the likelihood of the chief executive officer (CEO) being forcefully removed from the office for managing earnings in the previous year. JEL CLASSIFICATION G30; G34; G39

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Section: Earnings Management Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Regression Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Co-opted boards and earnings management: Evidence of reduced short-termist behavior

Harris

Erkan

2021

BRQ Business Research Quarterly

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“…Gender Socialization Theory is explained that human carry their childhood education in their adult lives, where women directors are perceived as a more ethical human than men (Harris, et al, 2019). Albanesy, et al (2015), explain that gender stereotype is when men are paid better than women because they perceived will have led a company into better performance, whereas if there is a bad performance in a company, it will be blamed to female directors.…”

Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Gender Socialization Theory stated that company with female directors having differences characteristics with male only leader Harris, et al (2019). This can happen since each leader grows up with their gender consciousness and stereotyping that made up their leadership style in the future.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Namwoong, et al(2017), therefore stated that gender pay gap due to a condition that the higher proportion of male executives the better firm performance. Hence, Harris, et al (2019), stated that women executive behaviour do not differ from men in managing earning to maximize their incentives. Based on those theoretical and previous research, this research attempt to test the companies' characteristics difference on performance, payment, risk, and earnings management between the company with and without female executives.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Gender Stereotypes in Indonesian Public Companies’ Performance

Rahayu

Ramadhanti

Rahayu

et al. 2019

JAM

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Gender equality is one important item from the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It makes a gender gap in companies' top management becomes valuable to be studied because people still have a stereotype that leadership is a masculine job.This research will test the effect of performance, payment, bankruptcy risk, and earnings management. Data is taken from Indonesian public companies in 2016 using means different statistical test. The result shows that 30.9% or minority corporation have a female director. Hence, while women were given the opportunity to lead, the companies will have better performance and compensation than their male only board of director counterparts. It is proof that gender stereotypes happen in Indonesian Public Companies Leadership.

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Director co‐option and the cash conversion cycle

Harris

Hampton

2022

J Corp Accounting Finance

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This study examines whether co-opted directors degrade or improve working capital efficiency. We find strong evidence that firms with more co-opted boards exhibit lower cash conversion cycles and so are more efficient at managing working capital. After controlling for other factors, board co-option reduces the length of the cash conversion cycle by about −1.2%, whereas the co-option of independent directors reduces the cycle by nearly −2.0%. These results persist even after addressing endogeneity and are robust to alternate measures of the cash conversion cycle. In general, our study lends credence to the argument that co-option reduces managerial myopic behavior as it reduces the likelihood of dismissal and so motivates managers to make better investment decisions that may improve firm proficiency.

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CEO Compensation and Earnings Management: Does Gender Really Matters?

Cited by 21 publications

References 0 publications

Co-opted boards and earnings management: Evidence of reduced short-termist behavior

Co-opted boards and earnings management: Evidence of reduced short-termist behavior

Gender Stereotypes in Indonesian Public Companies’ Performance

Director co‐option and the cash conversion cycle

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