Central bank transparency and central bank communication: Editorial introduction

Abstract

Central Bank transparency and central bank communicationEijffinger, Sylvester; de Haan, J.; Rybinski, K. General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research -You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain -You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. AbstractCentral banks now tend to attach greater importance to communication with the public than formerly was the case. Although the trend towards more transparency is justified by central bank accountability, it is less obvious that more central bank transparency is also beneficial from an economic point of view. It is also not clear what constitutes an optimal communication strategy. This introduction to the special issue on "Central bank transparency and central bank communication" reviews our current state of knowledge in this field and puts the contributions to this special issue in perspective.

Efectos de los anuncios de política monetaria sobre la volatilidad de la tasa de cambio: un análisis para Colombia, 2008-2015

“…Dicho en otros términos, el banco central es un importante jugador en el mercado financiero porque puede crear noticias y producir ruido (Kohn & Sack, 2004;de Haan, Eijffinger & Rybinski, 2007;Reves & Sawicki, 2007;Ehrmann & Fratzcher, 2007). Considerando las estimaciones de la ecuación (1), es construido el elemento sorpresa de los anuncios de política monetaria para el periodo completo, 2008-2015.…”

“…En general, la transparencia de los bancos es promovida por medio de la comunicación con el público y permite a los agentes entender la postura presente y futura de la política monetaria sobre los objetivos que pretende conquistar el banco central (Woodford, 2005;de Haan, Eijffinger & Rybinski, 2007).…”

Central Bank Governance and the Role of Nonfinancial Risk Management

“…Especially in the area of monetary policy decision making (where the board has that responsibility), issues have been raised on how decisions are made as a result of a group process. De Haan (2007) says on the role of monetary policy committees: "Broadly speaking, policy decisions within the committee may be made in a highly collegial manner, or they are taken primarily on the basis of the members' personal view. Likewise, communication may be more collegial or individualistic".…”

Central Bank Communication, Ambiguity and Market Interest Rates: A Case Study

“…The literature on central bank communication has shown it may use various channels and that there is no optimal central bank communication strategy, since one strategy could work for one central bank, but may not work for the other (de Haan et al 2007) [12].…”