Caught Red-Handed: How States Wield Proof to Coerce Wrongdoers

Abstract

States frequently acquire proof of other states' norm violations, from nuclear proliferation to harboring terrorists to interfering in elections. Existing theories do not fully explain how states that catch others red-handed wield a form of coercive power over the wrongdoers. Discoverers may conceal proof of wrongdoing, share such proof with other actors privately, or reveal their proof to the world. States with more leverage over wrongdoers have two incentives to conceal proof of wrongdoing. They can blackmail wrongdoers by threatening to go public with proof of their guilt, and they can simultaneously allow wrongdoers to save face. States that possess proof of wrongdoing but have less leverage are more likely to share that proof with others. If a discoverer distrusts the intentions of states with more leverage, it will reveal evidence publicly, catalyzing others to act. Publicizing proof weaponizes the prospect that other states will pay reputation and hypocrisy costs if they do not follow through on punishing norm violations. Four case studies of nuclear proliferation (Taiwan, Libya, South Africa, and North Korea) probe this novel theory.

Re-conceptualizing triangular coercion in International Relations

“…Recent examples can be seen in the manner in which the Belgium-based company SWIFT, which conducts the bulk of global cross-border payments, was forced to comply with US and EU sanctions of Iran and Russia in 2012 and 2022, respectively, and to ban the two countries from its services (Reuters, 2012). Another understudied manifestation of triangular coercion involves the threat of intelligence publicization, whereby states disclose or threaten to publicize evidence of another actor’s wrongdoing in a manner that could force third-party intervention (Nutt and Pauly, 2021; Riemer, 2021). Further insights on the workings of triangular coercion could potentially be gleaned from non-IR literature.…”

Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics

“…Reiter (2012) explains that public constraint is one reason why democratic leaders are deterred from taking secretive, deceptive actions in foreign policy. Democratic officials that secretly engage in activities that violate international norms or laws anticipate incurring “hypocrisy costs” or other forms of backlash from the public if their actions are revealed (Carson and Yarhi-Milo, 2017; Joseph and Poznansky, 2018; McManus and Yarhi-Milo, 2017; Nutt and Pauly, 2021; Poznansky, 2019; Reiter, 2012). In theory, anticipation of such reactions should inform government decision-making about when to conceal or reveal information.…”

“…These questions relate to a growing literature on secrecy in international relations. Much research in this area focuses on why governments employ secrecy in various aspects of foreign policy (e.g., Carson, 2016Carson, , 2018Carnegie andCarson, 2020, 2019;Carson and Yarhi-Milo, 2017;Cormac and Aldrich, 2018;Daugherty, 2006;Haas and Yarhi-Milo, 2020;Hafner-Burton, Steinert-Threlkeld and Victor, 2016;Johnson, 2022;Lester, 2015;McManus and Yarhi-Milo, 2017;Nutt and Pauly, 2021;O'Rourke, 2018;Otto and Spaniel, 2021;Pauly, 2022;Poznansky, 2019Poznansky, , 2020Stasavage, 2004;Schuessler, 2015;Yoder and Spaniel, 2022) and how they navigate trade-offs between the benefits of secrecy and the norms and institutions that facilitate transparency in democratic politics (e.g., Colaresi, 2014;Downes and Lilley, 2010;Forsythe, 1992;Poznansky, 2015;Smith, 2019;Spaniel and Poznansky, 2018). However, we know much less about how the public reacts to secrecy, especially in the context of international negotiations.…”

Sustainable Development Implementation of the Jibril Method in Learning Quran

“…In fact, the Quran is the verses that are evident in the hearts of those who are given knowledge. And no one denies our verses except the wrongdoers (Nutt & Pauly, 2021).…”