Category Captainship Practices in the Retail Industry

Kurtuluş, Mümin; Toktay, L. Beril

doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-7562-1_7

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…This response is an important and—as our interviewees pointed out—necessary protection mechanism; the harm caused by the leakage of certain types of information is too substantial to take the risk. Studies have shown that information leakages can lead to losses of competitive advantage for any type of organization when that information is being shared with current or potential future competitors (Hoecht & Trott, 2006; Kurtuluş & Toktay, 2009). In fact, some companies rely so heavily on the confidentiality of certain information—such as Coca‐Cola regarding the trade secret of its original beverage recipe—that the distribution of it could threaten the organization ' s very survival (Hettinger, 1989).…”

Section: Contributions Limitations and Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spillover effects of information leakages in buyer–supplier–supplier triads

Ried

Eckerd

Kaufmann

et al. 2020

J of Ops Management

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Information leakages—the unauthorized sharing of an organization's information with another organization—are a growing concern in today's supply chains, but remain relatively underexplored. Drawing on attribution theory and observational learning, our research investigates inter‐organizational information leakages from a network perspective. We assess the spillover effects of opportunistic and inadvertent information leakages between an OFFENDER organization and a VICTIM organization on the relationship between the OFFENDER and a nonpartisan OBSERVER. We consider the roles of integrity‐ and ability‐based trust, as well as operational similarity between the organizations. We conducted scenario‐based experiments with 181 sales practitioners recruited via MTurk and supplemented those results with post hoc interviews. Our results show clear spillover effects: The OBSERVER's willingness to share information with the OFFENDER decreases significantly after any type of information leakage between the OFFENDER and the VICTIM, but more so for opportunistic leakages. Integrity‐based trust mediates the relationship between intentionality and information sharing willingness. We also find indications of an unexpected collateral damage effect in that to some extent, both trust dimensions decrease in both forms of information leakage. Further, for opportunistic information leakages, the OBSERVER's willingness to share information with the OFFENDER decreases more when OBSERVER and VICTIM are operationally similar.

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Section: Contributions Limitations and Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spillover effects of information leakages in buyer–supplier–supplier triads

Ried

Eckerd

Kaufmann

et al. 2020

J of Ops Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Other theoretical models such as Kurtuluş and Nakkas (2011) study whether CCs can disadvantage non‐CC manufacturers, while Kurtuluş and Toktay (2011) study when CCs can benefit themselves but also other non‐CC manufacturers. Desrochers et al (2003) and Kurtuluş and Toktay (2015) have warned that the presence of a CC may result in the competitive exclusion of smaller brands, especially in those categories when the difference in market shares is large.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

One for all or all for one: Does the category captain play favourites

Kim

Shen

Basuroy

et al. 2023

Canadian J of Economics

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In the consumer packaged goods industry, category captain is the company (e.g., Pepsi) that retailers (e.g., Kroger) designate as the leader of an entire product category (e.g., carbonated beverages) and collaborate with to manage the product category through the process of category management. Much uncertainty exists about the consequences of category management. We use a unique data set on the ready-to-eat cereals category in which the retailer designated a category captain. In this paper, we find that category captain does not have more to gain in terms of market shares than other products within the ready-to-eat cereals category, alleviating antitrust concerns related to category management. In addition, we find that category captain increases the market share of products that are more price competitive, not necessarily that of its own products, which points to a category captain focusing on growing the category's market as it is incentivized to do so.Résumé. Un pour tous, tous pour un : le capitaine de catégorie est-il privilégié? Dans l'industrie des biens de consommation emballés, les capitaines de catégorie sont les entreprises (p. ex. Pepsi) que les magasins de détail (p. ex. Kroger) désignent comme étant les chefs de file de toute une catégorie de produits (p. ex. boissons gazéifiées) et qui collaborent avec eux pour gérer la catégorie de produits tout au long du processus de gestion par catégorie. Il y a beaucoup d'incertitudes quant aux conséquences de la gestion par catégorie. Nous utilisons un ensemble de données unique sur la catégorie des céréales prêtes à manger dans laquelle le magasin de détail a désigné un capitaine de catégorie. Dans cet article, nous constatons que le capitaine de catégorie n'est pas plus gagnant que les autres joueurs de la catégorie des céréales prêtes à manger en ce qui concerne les parts de marché, ce qui atténue les préoccupations en matière de pratiques antitrust associées à la gestion par catégorie. En outre, nous observons que le capitaine de catégorie augmente sa part de marché des produits qui sont plus concurrentiels du côté du prix, ce qui indique qu'un capitaine de catégorie se concentre sur la croissance du marché de la catégorie, car il y est encouragé.

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Category Captainship Practices in the Retail Industry

Cited by 2 publications

References 35 publications

Spillover effects of information leakages in buyer–supplier–supplier triads

Spillover effects of information leakages in buyer–supplier–supplier triads

One for all or all for one: Does the category captain play favourites

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